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CRITICAL RACE REALISM: RE-CLAIMING THE 
ANTIDISCRIMINATION PRINCIPLE THROUGH THE DOCTRINE OF 
GOOD FAITH IN CONTRACT LAW 
Emily M.S. Houh* 
INTRODUCTION 
This Article comprises the last leg of a larger project I have undertaken 
on the implied obligation of good faith in contract law. I have argued 
elsewhere that, as a descriptive matter, the doctrine of good faith and fair 
dealing in contract law, despite some theoretical controversy in the established 
scholarship on the doctrine, functions in contemporary contract law not as an 
implied contract term-as it was originally conceived-but as a rhetorical 
proxy for judicial analyses of material breach and constructive conditions 
relating to underlying breach of contract claims. I While such applications of 
good faith have been of great functional value to courts, lawyers, and students 
of contract law, I have argued that these developments have caused good faith 
jurisprudence to languish in an impoverished state and to further detach from 
the doctrine's equitable roots in implicit contractual obligation. As such, I 
also have argued from a critical race perspective that, as a normative matter 
and due to the inadequacies of civil rights remedies, good faith should be used 
to prohibit discriminatory conduct based on race, gender, sexual identity, age, 
and/or other categories of identity in the contractual context.2 
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Cincinnati College of Law. J.D., University of 
Michigan Law School. I am thankful to the Harold C. Schott Foundation at the University of Cincinnati 
College of Law, whose generous support made the writing of this article possible. I also am grateful to the 
following people for reading drafts of this article (in its many stages) and for their enormously helpful 
insights and comments: Pat Chew, Teri Dobbins, Adam Feibelman, Mitu Gulati, Sandra Johnson, Hiroshi 
Motomura, Camille Nelson, Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Gowri Ramachandran, Duncan Webb, Vema 
Williams, Ingrid Brunk Wuerth, and Alfred Yen. Finally, I am especially indebted to Joel Frederic, Kevin 
Hoskins, Jeanette McClellan, and Michelle Pan for their excellent research and editing assistance. All 
errors made in this article are, of course, mine alone. 
1. Emily M.S. Houh, The Doctrine of Good Faith in Contract Law: A (Nearly) Empty Vessel?, 
2005 UTAH L. REv. _ (forthcoming 2005). 
2. Emily M.S. Houh, Critical Interventions: Toward an Expansive Equality Approach to the 
Doctrine of Good Faith in Contract Law, 88 CORNELL L. REv. 1025 (2003) [hereinafter Critical 
Interventions]. 
455 
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While the above-referenced discussions of good faith offer descriptive, 
normative, and theoretical critiques, this Article aims to drive theory and 
critique into praxis by proposing a common law antidiscrimination claim that, 
first, incorporates contemporary re-conceptualizations of antidiscrimination 
jurisprudence, and, second, grounds itself doctrinally not in civil rights law 
but in the contractually implied obligation of good faith. Moreover, it seeks, 
through its proposal of the common law claim, to explicitly re-conceive the 
private law doctrine of good faith as one that might assist in effecting a public 
law norm of equality. 
This Article is divided into five parts. Part I develops from critical race 
and feminist perspectives how this project envisions equality, as well as how 
it understands and views discrimination. More specifically, Part I.A. discusses 
an equality principle that is informed primarily by Professor Iris Marion 
Young's analytical framework of (in)justice and difference. Part I.B. explores 
pathbreaking re-conceptualizations of the antidiscrimination principle with an 
emphasis on Professors Devon Carbado and Mitu Gulati' s theory of "working 
identity," which this Article attempts to operationalize in proposing its good 
faith discrimination claim. 
In a different theoretical vein, Part II explores another branch of 
jurisprudence that is closely related to critical legal theory of any brand: legal 
realism. For if this Article seeks to incorporate the public law norm of 
equality into the private law of contract, it must answer the following 
question, first raised by the legal realists in the early twentieth century: why 
does the distinction between private and public law persist and to the extent 
that it does, should it be blurred in some circumstances? Although these 
questions were the subject of lively debate throughout most of the twentieth 
century, the rich and excellent scholarship addressing the public-private 
distinction had petered out by the mid-1980's,3 perhaps because, by then, 
critical and neoconservative scholars had staked out their intellectual 
territories so oppositionally and deeply.4 Notwithstanding the arrested 
3. See Clare Dalton, An Essay in the Deconstruction of Contract Doctrine, 94 YALE L.J. 997, IO 14 
(1985) (arguing that "the Realist challenge to the 'privateness' of contract hard] been assimilated and 
defused" within decades of original challenges in the early 20th century to the public-private distinction). 
4. For example, law and economics scholars and critical race theorists have long been at odds with 
one another, sometimes dismissing each other, quite publicly, out of hand. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, 
The Skin Trade, THE NEW REpUBUC, Oct. 13, 1997, at 40 (book review) ("Every intellectual movement 
has a lunatic fringe. Radical legal egalitarianism is distinguished by having a rational fringe and a lunatic 
core. The latter is constituted by the critical race theorists and the other legal academics who have 
swallowed postrnodemism hook, line, and sinker .... "); Richard Delgado, Rodrigo's Second Chronicle: 
The Economics and Politics of Race, 91 MICH. L. REv. 1183, 1187-88 (1993) (book review) (describing 
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development of private-public theorizing, this Article responds affirmatively 
to the question of whether the public-private distinction should be blurred in 
some circumstances. Part IT develops what this Article calls "critical race 
realism"-in part to counter the "racial realism" movement5-to argue that the 
public-private dichotomy should be explicitly subverted as part of the critical 
race project when its subversion might facilitate the elimination of both 
material and ideological racial inequalities that are perpetuated by currently 
existing legal frameworks. Thus, critical race realism encompasses not only 
the goals and methodologies of the broader critical race and feminist projects, 
but also some of the shared goals and methodologies of legal realism and law 
and market economy theory (which I have integrated into my critical race 
work elsewhere6). 
Part m of this Article describes how critical race realism might be put to 
work. Part m.A. sets forth the elements of the good faith discrimination 
claim, which incorporates critical race realism and is doctrinally grounded in 
the contractual obligation of good faith. Part m.A. also briefly discusses the 
appropriate remedy for a breach of the good faith discrimination claim and 
explains what this claim offers remedially that civil rights claims do not. Part 
m.B. looks at several cases where plaintiffs asserted, among their various 
claims, violations of section 1981 of the Civil Rights Act, in order to 
demonstrate the inadequacy of statutory civil rights remedies to address the 
different types of subordination and inequality discussed in Part I of this 
Article. Part m.B. further applies the elements of the proposed common law 
claim to the facts of these cases, enabling one to see what the good faith 
discrimination claim offers that existing civil rights claims do not. Part IV of 
this Article concludes the above discussion. 
the difference between legal economists and critical race scholars, Delgado writes: 'The law-and-
economics folks .... talk about things like transaction costs, speak of racism as a 'taste,' and spend more 
time showing why governmental efforts to cure it would be 'inefficient' than they do deploring the practice 
itself. We, on the other hand, treat racism as subordination, not a mistake, much less an idiosyncratic 
'taste,' and struggle to understand its connection with culture, history, and the search for psychic and 
economic advantage."). 
5. See infra Part m.B. 
6. See Critical Interventions, supra note 2 (arguing that by screening good faith doctrine through 
the lenses of critical race and law and market economy theories, using good faith to prohibit improper 
considerations of race in contracting is consistent not only with equitable principles embodied by doctrines 
of implicit obligation, but also with contractual goals of protecting parties' bargains, wealth formation, and 
the facilitation of exchange transactions). 
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I. DEFINING EQUALITY AND RE-THEORIZING DISCRIMINATION 
A. Equality 
Because this Article is aligned explicitly with the projects of critical race 
theory and feminist legal theory, it is important to define its use of the term 
"equality." This article conceives of equality broadly, or "expansively," as I 
have written elsewhere.7 That is, this project's conception of equality 
encompasses not only formalS and substantive9 theories of equality, but also 
an antisubordination theory of equality that gives primacy to the ways in 
which power circulates, sociopolitically and socioculturally, to reproduce and 
sustain white supremacy and male domination. 10 
7. See Criticallnterventions, supra note 2, at Part ffi.A.2. (describing expansive and restrictive 
views of goals of antidiscrimination law). 
8. See CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEXEQUAUTY 3-24 (2001). Of formal equality, "the core of 
conventional equality law," MacKinnon states: 
[Formal equality's] familiar calculus-sameness and difference, identity and distinction-requires 
same treatment if one is the same, different treatment if one is different. The concept is clearly 
premised on some original just status quo allocation and presupposes a uniform measuring device 
for whatever is to be distributed .... As equality is like treatment for likes, inequality means 
different treatment for likes, same treatment for unlikes. 
ld. at 6. 
9. See KATHARINE T. BARTLETI ET AL., GENDER AND LAw: THEORY, DOCfRINE, COMMENTARY 
265 (3d ed. 2002) ("While formal sex equality judges the form of a rule, requiring that it treat women and 
men on the same terms without special barriers or favors on account of their sex, substantive equality looks 
to a rule's results or effects . ... Advocates of substantive equality demand that rules take account of these 
differences to avoid differential impacts that are considered unfair."). In feminist parlance, substantive 
equality is sometimes referred to as "difference feminism." The concept of substantive equality made its 
way into American constitutional law through the famous footnote 4 of the Supreme Court case United 
States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938), which states that ''prejudice against 
discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation 
of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call for a 
correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry." ld. (emphasis added). Thus, "discrete and insular 
minorities" constituted the original suspect class, for equal protection purposes, and classifications based 
on race-specifically the Black race-were thus subject to strict judicial scrutiny due to the histories and 
legacies of oppression against Blacks in America. In modem constitutional jurisprudence, little to no 
attention is paid to the "discrete and insular" status of particular minorities; rather, all racial classifications 
are now subject to strict scrutiny. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326 (2003) ("[A]ll racial 
classifications imposed by government 'must be analyzed by a reviewing court under strict scrutiny. "') 
(citing Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995)). 
10. See BARTlEIT ET AL., supra note 9, at 533 (stating that anti subordination theory, "sometimes 
referred to as dominance theory, makes the relevant inquiry not whether women are like, or unlike, men, 
but whether a rule or practice serves to subordinate women to men. Accordingly, similarities and 
differences between women and men are important not as givens that that produce certain expected, rational 
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This Article's conception of equality is best analogized to Iris Marion 
Young's conception of justice. In her influential work, Justice and the 
Politics of Difference,1I Young critiques modem, liberal, and distributive 
theories of justice as reductionist in their "tendency to reduce political 
subjects to a unity and to value commonness or sameness over specificity and 
difference,"12 and argues instead that "[o]ppression and domination ... should 
be the primary terms for conceptualizing injustice.,,13 Young defines injustice 
as being comprised of interlocking forms of systemic, social conditions of 
oppression, which she refers to collectively as "the five faces of oppression," 
namely: exploitation, marginalization, powerlessness, cultural imperialism, 
and violence. 14 These "five faces" are described in more detail below. 
Young describes the nonnative form of exploitation at play here in 
explicitly Marxist terms. She states: 
The central insight expressed in the concept of exploitation ... is that ... [it] occurs 
through a steady process of the transfer of the results of the labor of one social group to 
benefit another. The injustice of class division does not consist only in the distributive 
fact that some people have great wealth while most have little. Exploitation enacts a 
structural relation between social groups. Social rules about what work is, who does 
what for whom, how work is compensated, and the social process by which the results 
of work are appropriated operate to enact relations of power and inequality. IS 
Young's description of exploitation parallels, in legal terms, de jure 
discrimination. That is, where exploitation enacts economic and material 
inequality, de jure discrimination enacts, or has enacted at various points in 
American history, legal inequality-in the forms, for example, of slavery, Jim 
Crow laws, the marital rape exemption, and, arguably, the military's don't-
ask-don't-tell policy. Moreover, according to Young, because this form of 
class and economic exploitation is politically, culturally, and socially 
transmitted and reproduced, its attendant injustices cannot be eliminated 
simply vis-a-vis the redistribution of goods and resources. Rather, according 
to her, the elimination of injustice and the bringing about of equality require 
both the "re-organization of institutions and practices of decisionmaking," as 
consequences in the law, but as part of a larger conceptual system designed to make women's subordination 
seem natural and legitimate."); CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 
215-34 (1989) (providing a feminist critique of formal equality in the context of sex discrimination law). 
11. IRIS MARION YOUNG, JUSTICE AND THE Pouncs OF DIFFERENCE (1990). 
12. [d. at 3. 
13. [d. at 9. 
14. [d. at 37, 49-63. 
15. [d. at 49-50 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). 
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well as "similar measures of institutional, structural, and cultural change. ,,16 
Similarly, at the sociolegal level, the elimination of injustice requires the 
elimination of both de jure and de facto discrimination. 
With respect to marginalization, Young defines marginals as "people the 
system of labor cannot or will not use.,,17 Defined in this way, marginals in 
the United States, historically and statistically, have been comprised of people 
with black and brown 18 skin. However, as Young notes, marginalization does 
not only impact people of color; it also disempowers the elderly, disabled, 
young and "unskilled," and single mothers and their children. 19 Young further 
points out that oppression caused by marginalization does not dissipate when 
material necessities like food and shelter are provided. Rather, Young writes: 
Even if marginals were provided a comfortable material life within institutions that 
respected their freedom and dignity, injustices of marginality would remain in the form 
of uselessness, boredom, and lack of self-respect. . . . Thus while marginalization 
definitely entails serious issues of distributive justice, it also involves the deprivation of 
cultural, practical, and institutionalized conditionsforexercising capacities in a context 
of recognition and interaction.20 
Here again, Young's linking of material oppression in the form of 
marginalization to ideological oppression in the form of cultural domination 
and deprivation of agency, is analogous to the co-existence of de jure and de 
facto discrimination, which is to say both structural/material and 
ideological/social practices must be eliminated in order to eliminate injustice. 
According to Young, in an unjust society, exploitation and 
marginalization are accompanied by powerlessness, which manifests itself 
most demonstrably, but not exclusively, as racism and sexism.21 Young 
describes the sorts of injuries associated with such powerlessness as 
"inhibition in the development of one's capacities, lack of decisionmaking 
power in one's working life, and exposure to disrespectful treatment because 
16. [d. at 53 (emphasis added). 
17. [d. 
18. This category includes not only Mrican Americans, but also American Indians, Latinos, and 
Asian Pacific Americans, all of whom have been legally and culturally constructed as "outsiders" to 
American society and culture. See JUAN F. PEREA ET AL., RACE AND RACES: CASES AND RESOURCES FOR 
A DNERSE AMERICA 91-428 (2000) (examining at length the varying histories of discrimination suffered 
by communities of color in the United States). 
19. YOUNG, supra note II, at 53. 
20. [d. at 55 (emphasis added). 
21. [d. at 58. 
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of the status one occupies.'>22 In other words, "[i]n daily interchange women 
and men of color must prove their respectability. ,,23 
This kind of powerlessness also describes the attendant psychic and 
sociocultural harms of both dejure and defacto forms of discrimination. The 
subordination of minorities and women, while perhaps lessened in some 
respects, does not disappear simply because the state no longer legally 
sanctions egregious forms of discrimination, for the law, as it is understood 
by and imposed on a nation's citizens, plays an essential role in shaping that 
nation's culture and values. Moreover, culture responds slowly to legal 
change (and vice versa), even momentous legal changes such as those 
resulting from civil rights and women's movements of the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries.24 And, where blatant forms of white and male supremacy 
were once reified by the law and its often violent and brutal enforcement, the 
legacies of those legal forms of domination persist in material and ideological 
ways, in the form of what Young describes as powerlessness and as cultural 
imperialism (discussed further infra). These material, ideological, and, hence, 
cultural, legacies are much more difficult to transform because the myriad 
apparatuses of their transmission lack the purportedly transparent structure 
and process of legal reform.25 
Cultural imperialism is both unique and essential to the projects of 
dominance because of its specifically ideological nature and function. 
Cultural imperialism is the "universalization of a dominant group's experience 
and culture, ... its establishment as the norm . .. [and] as representative of 
humanity as such. ,,26 This normalization of the dominant group's experiences 
and culture is dialectical in that it interprets and constructs minority and 
22. Id. 
23. Id. 
24. Here, I refer to early feminist movements for women's suffrage, reproductive, and economic 
rights, and to early Black resistance and abolitionist movements against slavery. See generally LERONE 
BENNEIT, JR., BEFORE THE MAYFLOWER: A HISTORY OF BLACK AMERICA (Penguin Books 5th ed. 1984) 
(1962); UNEQUAL SISTERS: A MULTICULTURAL READER IN U.S. WOMEN'S HisToRY (Ellen Carol DuBois 
& Vicki L. Ruiz eds., 1990). 
25. In his well known essay, Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses (Notes Towards an 
Investigation), Louis Althusser introduced his concept of the "ideological state apparatus," or, the "ISA." 
Louis Althusser, Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses (Notes Towards an Investigation), in LENIN 
AND PHILOSOPHY AND 0niER EsSAYS 127-86 (Ben Brewster trans., 1971). In his essay on ISAs, Althusser 
theorized about "the reproduction of the conditions of production" and hegemonic ideology vis-a.-vis, in 
part, the private domains of: "the religious ISA (the system of the different churches) ... , the family ISA, 
the legal ISA, the political ISA (the political system, including the different Parties) . . . , the 
communications ISA (press, radio and television, etc.), [and] the cultural ISA (Literature, the Arts, sports, 
etc.}." Id. at 127, 143. 
26. YOUNG, supra note II, at 59 (emphasis added). 
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"outsider,,27 groups as "the Other.,,28 According to Young, those groups 
marked as Other "are both marked out by stereotypes and at the same time 
rendered invisible. The stereotypes confine them to a nature which is often 
attached in some way to their bodies, and which thus cannot easily be denied. 
These stereotypes so permeate the society that they are not noticed as 
contestable.,,29 In other words, cultural imperialism works brilliantly as a 
mechanism of oppression because of its dialectical rendering not only of the 
normal and the Other, but also of the Other as both invisible yet completely 
knowable-or "essentialized,,30-to the dominant group. Cultural 
imperialism, and essentialism in particular, have been thoroughly explored by 
critical race theorists, feminist legal theorists, and scholars of cultural 
studies.3) 
27. Here, I tum to a phrase originated by Richard Delgado, whose writings form part of critical race 
scholarship's core. He defines "outgroups" as "any group whose consciousness is other than that of the 
dominant one." Richard Delgado, Storytelling for Oppositionists and Others: A Plea for Narrative, 87 
MICH. L. REv. 2411, 2412 n.8 (1989). I use the term "outsiders" to refer to individual members of 
outgroups. For an excellent and concise discussion of how outsider scholarship and "outlaw" texts 
contribute to legal scholarship, see Kristin Brandser Kaisem, Lookingfor Law in All the "Wrong" Places: 
Outlaw Texts and Early Women's Advocacy, 13 S. CAL. REv. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 273, 278-80 (2004). 
28. YOUNG, supra note 11, at 59 (emphasis added). See also Stuart Hall, The Spectacle of the 
'Other, 'in REpRESENTATION: CULTURAL REpRESENTATIONS AND SIGNIFYING PRACTICES 223,239 (Stuart 
Hall ed., 1997) (discussing how slave trade, European colonization of Africa, and post-World War II 
migration from 'Third World" to Europe and North America impacted development of the racialized 
"Other," and created "repertoires of representation and representational practices which have been used to 
mark racial difference and signify the racialized 'Other' in western popular culture"); ANNE McCLINTOCK, 
IMPERIAL LEATHER: RACE, GENDER, AND SEXUALITY IN THE COLONIAL CONTEST (1995) (analyzing 
representations set forth in novels, advertising, poetry, and mass commodity spectacle through feminist, 
post-colonial, and psychoanalytic theoretical lenses, to argue that categories of race, gender, and class do 
not exist in isolation, but emerge in intimate relation to one another); EDWARD W. SAID, ORIENTALISM 3 
(1978) [hereinafter ORIENT AUSM) (describing OrientaIism-a specific discursive iteration of the Other-as 
a "Western style for dominating, restructuring, and having authority over the Orient"; further, Orientalism 
names the "enormously systematic discipline by which European culture was able to manage-and even 
produce-the Orient politically, sociologically, militarily, ideologically, scientifically, and imaginatively 
during the post-Enlightenment period," through European colonialism in the Middle East; in theorizing 
OrientaIism, Said also demonstrates that "European culture gained in strength and identity by setting itself 
off against the Orient as a sort of surrogate and even underground self."). 
29. YOUNG, supra note 11, at 59. 
30. [d. See also FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY: AN ANTI-EssENTIALIST READER 5 (Nancy E. Dowd & 
Michelle S. Jacobs eds., 2003) (defining essentialism as that which "demonstrates an understanding of 
gender based only on the lived experience of middle-class white women"); Angela P. Harris, Race and 
Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REv. 581, 585 (1990) (defining "gender essentialism" 
as "the notion that a unitary, 'essential' women's experience can be isolated and described independently 
of race, class, sexual orientation, and other realities of experience"). 
31. See, e.g., Hall, supra note 28, at 225-26 (exploring the representational practice of 
"stereotyping" and "whether there can be an effective [and critical) 'politics of representation"'); EDWARD 
W. SAID, CULTURE AND IMPERIAUSM (1993) (examining underlying representations of imperialism in 
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Violence is the last component of Young's theory of oppression and 
injustice. According to her, "[w]hat makes violence a face of oppression is 
... the social context surrounding [such acts of violence], which makes them 
possible and even acceptable. What makes violence a phenomenon of social 
injustice, and not merely an individual moral wrong, is its systemic character, 
its existence as a social practice.'>32 That is, violence as a social practice can 
be understood as the most forceful response not only to outsiders' resistance 
to cultural hegemony, but also to their institutional advancement resulting 
from the removal of structural forms of domination, that is, of de jure 
discrimination.33 Systemic acts of violence-for example in the forms of hate 
crimes and sexual and/or racial harassment-keep the Other in its place when 
it has advanced to or beyond a certain point in various contexts, such as at 
work or in school, thereby "taking away" perceived entitlements theretofore 
reserved for those in the majority. 
B. Antidiscrimination Principles 
1. Critical Race Theory and the Five Faces o/Oppression 
To be committed to equality and justice, then, is to be committed to the 
elimination of each of Young's five faces of oppression, which, for purposes 
of this Article, requires an explication and understanding of how conventional 
antidiscrimination jurisprudence addresses and/or fails to address these five 
faces, individually and collectively. First, with respect to exploitation in the 
workplace, traditional civil rights laws were designed to change the "[s]ocial 
rules about what work is,,34 by removing structural barriers to workplace 
opportunity. In more broad-ranging terms, civil rights laws aim to integrate 
American social and working life by altering our notions about "who does 
what for whom," and "how work is compensated."35 But, while civil rights 
laws have removed some barriers and impacted some decision-making 
nineteenth and twentieth century English and French literature, and analyzing works by authors such as 
Jane Austen, Rudyard Kipling, Joseph Conrad, Albert Camus, and E.M. Forster); ORIENTAUSM, supra note 
28. 
32. YOUNG, supra note II, at 61-62 (emphasis added). 
33. See id. at 63 ('''The culturally imperialized may reject the dominant meanings and attempt to 
assert their own subjectivity, or the fact of their cultural difference may put the lie to the dominant culture's 
implicit claim to universality. The dissonance generated by such a challenge to the hegemonic cultural 
meanings can also be a source of irrational violence."). 
34. [d. at 50. 
35. [d. 
HeinOnline -- 66 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 464 2004-2005
464 UNIVERSITY OF PITISBURGH LAW REVIEW [Vol. 66:455 
practices in some hiring and promotion contexts, they have done little to 
address de facto discrimination. Arguably, antidiscrimination laws have 
reified marginalization, powerlessness, and/or cultural imperialism by failing 
to address in any substantive way "the social process by which the results of 
work [and work itself] are appropriated.,,36 While the enforcement of civil 
rights laws has resulted, in distributive terms, in some (slight) diversification 
of the middle, upper-middle, and elite classes, it has not lessened the 
discursive harm associated with marginalization, powerlessness, and cultural 
imperialism. As critical race theorists have been pointing out for decades, on 
a day-to-day basis "women and men of color must [continue to] prove their 
respectability.'>37 Civil rights laws have done very little to dispel, for example, 
well-established racial and gender stereotyping--or "scripting,,38--of people 
of color and women, particularly in the workplace. 
Critical race theorists have provided important insights into the ways in 
which antidiscrimination laws not only have failed to address, but also have 
further entrenched, ideological and thus material forms of discrimination. 
According to legal scholars such as Kimberle Crenshaw, Charles Lawrence, 
Angela Harris, Mari Matsuda, Richard Delgado, Catharine MacKinnon, Alan 
David Freeman, and Neil Gotanda-among many others-this is due to 
antidiscrimination laws' wholesale adoption of neo-liberal, or more aptly, neo-
conservati ve, conceptions of equality. 39 Crenshaw, for example, has identified 
36. Id. (emphasis added). 
37. Id. at 58. See, e.g., Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, Conversations at Work, 79 OR. L. REV. 
103 (2000) (examining relationships between stereotyping and workplace conversations, workplace identity, 
and workplace discrimination); Katheryn K. Russell, "Driving While Black": Corollary Phenomena and 
Collateral Consequences, 40 B.C. L. REv. 717, 721-25 (1999) (demonstrating how everyday phenomenon 
related to racial profiling-such as "walking," "idling," "standing," and "shopping"-while black, results 
in the reification of mythic Black criminality). 
38. See Videotape: Ethnic Notions (Marlon Riggs 1987); Videotape: Color Adjustment (Marlon 
Riggs 1991). In Ethnic Notions and Color Adjustment, two pathbreaking public television documentaries, 
the late poet and filmmaker, Marlon Riggs, explored the ways in which African American identities 
historically have been "scripted" through their limited and often degrading representations in various forms 
of popular culture. 
39. See Kimberle Williams Crenshaw, Race. Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and 
Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARv. L. REv. 1331 (1988) (discussed infra at note 55); 
Charles R. Lawrence m, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 
STAN. L. REv. 317 ( 1987) (critiquing the intent requirement in constitutional discrimination jurisprudence 
as ahistorical and decontextual); Angela P. Harris, Equality Trouble: Sameness and Difference in 
Twentieth-Century Race Law, 88 CAL. L. REv. 1923 (2000) (arguing that sameness and difference 
frameworks of equality elide the central issue of power (i.e., who sets standards of sameness and difference, 
thereby making freedom and justice difficult, if not impossible, to obtain without development of alternative 
equality frameworks»; Mari J. Matsuda, Forward: McCarthyism, the Internment and the Contradictions 
of Power, 40 B.C. L. REV. 9, 9-10 (1998), 19 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 9, 9-10 (1998) (''The [Japanese 
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the foundational differences between expansive and restrictive views of 
equality. The expansive view: 
stresses equality as a result, and looks to real consequences for [subordinated classes, 
such as] African Americans. It interprets the objective of antidiscrimination law as the 
eradication of the substantive conditions of Black subordination and attempts to enlist 
the institutional power of the courts to further the national goal of eradicating the effects 
of racial oppression.40 
This stands in contrast to the restrictive view of equality, which: 
treats equality as a process, downplaying the significance of actual outcomes. The 
primary objective of antidiscrimination law ... is to prevent future wrongdoing rather 
than to redress present manifestations of past injustice. "Wrongdoing," moreover, is seen 
primarily as isolated actions against individuals rather than as a societal policy against 
an entire group. Nor does the restrictive view contemplate the courts playing a role in 
redressing harms from America's racist past, as opposed to merely policing society to 
eliminate a narrow set of proscribed discriminatory practices. . .. In sum, the restrictive 
view seeks to proscribe only certain kinds of subordinating acts, and then only when 
other interests are not overly burdened.41 
This restrictive view, coupled with a doctrinal emphasis in the law on the 
"perpetrator perspective" and on the perpetrator's intent,42 function to (re )cast 
the Other, who is ostensibly protected under the law, as presumptively and 
American] internment story both presages and diverges from the Cold War story, making way for our 
contemporary map of power: racism and class privilege dancing unscathed behind the curtains marked 
'formal equality' and 'free market.' ... There is a Constitutional promise of liberty and equality, violated 
in both instances [of McCarthyism and internment], which we have yet to uphold. "); Richard Delgado, The 
Imperial Scholar: Reflections on a Review of Civil Rights Literature, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 561, 566 (1984) 
(critiquing then-existing civil rights scholarship as being overwhelmingly authored by liberal white male 
academics and revealing ''white scholars' systematic occupation of, and exclusion of minority scholars 
from, the central areas of civil rights scholarship"); MACKINNON, supra note 10, at 234 (''The mainstream 
law of equality assumes that society is already fundamentally equal. It gi ves women legally no more than 
they already have socially, and little it cannot also give men."); Alan David Freeman, Legitimizing Racial 
Discrimination Through Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical Review of Supreme Coun Doctrine, 62 MINN. 
L. REv. 1049, 1052-57 (1978) (arguing that antidiscrimination law legitimizes discrimination because it 
focuses doctrinally on the intent of the alleged perpetrator, rather than on the systemic conditions of racial 
subordination and the condition of the victim); Neil Gotanda, A Critique of "Our Constitution is Color-
Blind," 44 STAN. L. REv. I (1991) (discussed infra at Part 1.B.2.). 
40. Crenshaw, supra note 39, at 1341; see also YOUNG, supra note II, at 9 (arguing that injustice 
should be conceptualized primarily in terms of oppression and domination). 
41. Crenshaw, supra note 39, at 1342 (footnote omitted) (citing DERRICK A. BELL, JR., RACE, 
RACISM AND AMERICAN LAw § 1.12, at 41 (2d ed. 1981». 
42. See Freeman, supra note 39, at 1052-57. 
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essentially non-credible and, as the late Jerome Culp put it, as the 
"(perpetually possible) subject of discrimination.,,43 
2. Imploding the Myth of Colorblindness 
Speaking more specifically to constitutional jurisprudence on racial 
discrimination, Professor Gotanda has imploded the myth of constitutional 
colorblindness, exposing it as the juridical legitimation of white supremacy, 
veiled in the rhetoric of neutrality and colorblindness.44 In his work, Gotanda 
reveals certain normative techniques that the Supreme Court has employed, 
all of which function, intentionally or not, to situate racial minorities as Other 
to the white majority. For example, in his analysis of the way in which the 
Court historically has distinguished between actionable public discrimination 
and non-actionable private discrimination, Gotanda demonstrates how the 
Court "obscures the contingent and political character of the initial 
designation [of public vs. private].,,45 As such, writes Gotanda, "subsequent 
challenges [by outsiders] to the subordinating effects of such a 'neutral' 
distinction are then criticized as 'political. ",46 
Gotanda also exposes the Supreme Court's tendency to decontextualize 
and deny the material conditions of racial oppression through its technique of 
racial nonrecognition: 
[Nonrecognition] addresses the question of race, not by examining the social realities or 
legal categories of race, but by setting forth an analytical methodology. This technical 
approach permits a court to describe, to accommodate, and then to ignore issues of 
subordination. This deflection from the substantive to the methodological is significant. 
Because the technique appears purely procedural, its normative, substantive impact is 
hidden. Color-blind application of the technique is important because it suggests a 
seemingly neutral and objective method of decisionmaking that avoids any consideration 
ofrace.47 
This "discounting [of] 'racialness,'" which Gotanda also claims is inconsistent 
with the philosophical underpinnings of American constitutionalism,48 results 
43. Jerome M. Culp, Jr. et aI., Subject Unrest, 55 STAN. L. REv. 2435, 2444 (2003) (book review). 
44. Specifically, Gotanda writes, "A color-blind interpretation of the Constitution legitimates, and 
thereby maintains, the social, economic, and political advantages that whites hold over other Americans." 
Gotanda, supra note 39, at 2-3. In other words, a color-blind interpretation of the Constitution legitimates 
white supremacy. 
45. ld. at 13. 
46. ld. 
47. ld. at 17. 
48. ld. at 21. 
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in the "repression and denial of racial subordination.,,49 That is to say, based 
on Gotanda's critique, constitutional antidiscrimination jurisprudence is 
merely declaratory, for it denies the existence of the interlocking material and 
ideological conditions of racial subordination altogether. 
3. Responding to Ideological "Violence" 
In its most devastating and literal forms, violence-the last of Young's 
five faces of oppression-manifests as hate crimes perpetrated by those in the 
majority (Whites, males, and heterosexuals) against women and racial and 
sexual minorities. Although ongoing struggles in state and municipal 
legislatures over whether the hate crime should even exist belie an unstable 
social and political commitment to the elimination of this aspect of 
oppression, the hate crimes "movement" has m~t with some limited success. 50 
Without minimizing the profound effect of hate crimes, this Article concerns 
itself more specifically with the less physical and more psychological 
manifestations of subordinating violence, that is, with forms of racial and 
sexual harassment in the workplace that are deemed acceptable because they 
conform to acceptable stereotypes of particular social groups. For courts have 
held that some form of harassment of women in traditionally male spaces,51 
people of color in traditionally white spaces,52 and lesbian, gay, bisexual, and 
transgendered persons in traditionally straight spaces53 is permissible. 
Additionally these courts have found that harassment of such persons is 
actionable only when it rises to a standard of pervasive and extreme hostility, 
which standard courts have developed, nonsensically, by deferring in most 
cases to those in the majority.54 
49. [d. at 21-23. 
SO. Legislative and community-based attempts to deal with this kind of violence have been well-
documented by legal and other scholars. See, e.g., JEANNINE BElL, PoUCING HATRED: LAw 
ENFORCEMENT, CIVIL RIGHTS, AND HATE CRIME (2002) (exploring impact of hate crime laws from the 
perspective of police officers and prosecutors enforcing them, taking into account not only impact on 
victims, but on defendants' first amendment rights, and on society as a whole). 
51. See, e.g., Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (1993); Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 
U.S. 57 (1986); Hicks v. Gates Rubber Co.; 833 F.2d 1406 (10th Cir. 1987); Parton v. GTE North, Inc., 
802 F. Supp. 241 (W.O. Mo. 1991). 
52. See, e.g., Ramseyv. Henderson, 286 F.3d 264 (5th Cir. 2002); Hicks, 833 F.2d 1406; Gharzouzi 
v. N.W. Human Servs. ofPa., 225 F. Supp. 2d 514 (E.O. Pa. 2002). 
53. See, e.g., Feingold v. New York, 366 F.3d 138 (2d Cir. 2004); Patches v. City of Phoenix, No. 
02-15408,2003 WL 21206120 (9th Cir. May 12,2003); Kay v.lndependence Blue Cross, 91 Fair Empl. 
Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1559 (E.O. Pa. 2003). 
54. See supra notes 51-53. 
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4. Re-Theorizing Discrimination: Carbado and Gulati's "Working 
Identity" 
Critical race theory and Young's theory of oppression also overlap in that 
both lead to the conclusion that legal applications of neo-conservative 
interpretations of equality cannot possibly succeed in eliminating inequality 
because those interpretations assume the absence in society of hegemonic 
racial power and subordination.55 Unfortunately, it appears that civil rights 
discourse, with some limited exception,56 has moved increasingly toward an 
exclusive adoption of the restrictive view of equality, in that the law names as 
discriminatory, with only a very few exceptions, discrete sets of de-
contextualized acts that are inflicted on a victim by an atomistic perpetrator 
who intends to do harm.57 Notwithstanding the availability of the "disparate 
55. See Crenshaw, supra note 39, at 1344-46. "[T]o believe ... that color-blind policies represent 
the only legitimate and effective means of ensuring a racially equitable society, one would have to assume 
not only that there is only one 'proper role' for law, but also that such a racially equitable society already 
exists." Id. at 1344. 
56. The Supreme Court's recent decision in Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003), in which it 
upheld the University of Michigan Law School'S race-conscious admissions policy and affirmed that 
diversity is a compelling state interest for equal protection purposes, offers some hope in this regard, but 
only a very small amount. For example, Justice O'Connor, writing for the majority in that case, wrote that: 
"Context matters when reviewing race-based governmental action under the Equal Protection Clause. 
[citations omitted]. ... Not every decision influenced by race is equally objectionable .... " Id. at 327. 
The Court also accepted the Law School's argument that its goal of assembling a diverse student body that 
includes a "critical mass" of students of color-a concept that is itself based on the anti-essentialist idea 
that students of color do not necessarily share a unitary perspective-did not constitute a quota. Id. at 
329-36. However, the Court's reasoning in upholding the Law School'S policy is troubling in other ways. 
For example, in rendering its opinion, the Court did not reconsider in any way its neo-conservative dream 
of the "colorblind society." See id. at 349-78 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Just as troubling is the Court's 
reasoning regarding the value of diversity, which helps to break down stereotypes of minorities, which 
presumes that minority students are valuable first and foremost for the educational benefits they will confer 
on their majority classmates, and that they have an obligation to confer those benefits in the fust place. 
While it is true that we all benefit from the breaking down of stereotypes, students of color are far more 
susceptible to being typed in specific and particularly negative ways by their peers, teachers, and potential 
employers than are majority students; consequently, they must do more to "diminish[ 1 the force of such 
stereotypes" than their majority counterparts. See id. at 333; see also Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Just 
Another Brother on the SCI: What Justice Clarence Thomas Teaches Us About the Influence of Racial 
Identity, 90 IOWA L. REV. _ (forthcoming 2005) (arguing that despite allegations of his "anti-black" 
news, Justice Thomas's is grounded specifically in black conservative thought). 
57. See Critical Interventions, supra note 2, at 1059-61 (criticizing the perpetrator perspective of 
racial discrimination, which views discrimination as a discrete set of acts inflicted on the victim by the 
perpetrator, and arguing that antidiscrimination law's focus on intentional discrimination is a manifestation 
of the perpetrator perspective). 
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impact" claim under Title VIT, which has "all but vanished from the scene,,,58 
the law does not define discrimination as a set of culturally-acceptable and 
institutionally-perpetuated social practices rooted in the legacies of white 
supremacy and male dominance. This is to say that antidiscrimination law, 
through its adoption of restrictive views of equality, ignores the discursive 
aspects of Young's faces of oppression. Legally speaking, in other words, 
antidiscrimination law simply does not address de Jacto discrimination. 
Professors Devon Carbado and Mitu Gulati have made the case for an 
antidiscrimination discourse that explicitly takes account of these three 
disregarded faces of oppression. Their theory of "working identity" explores 
the behavioral concepts of signaling and identity performance59 in the 
employment context and posits that members of outsider groups in the 
workplace often must do extra identity work because those outsiders correctly 
perceive themselves as subject to negative stereotypes in the workplace.60 Put 
another way, members of outsider groups in the workplace often feel 
compelled to perform and signal "loudly" against negative identity-related 
stereotypes in order to prevent discrimination based on those stereotypes. 
58. Martha Chamallas, Title VII's Midlife Crisis: The Case of Constructive Discharge, 77 S. CAL. 
L. REv. 307, 348 & n.163 (2004) (citing John J. Donohue ill & Peter Siegelman, The Changing Nature of 
Employment Discrimination Litigation, 43 STAN. L. REv. 983, 989 (1991), for the proposition "that 
disparate impact cases accounted for less than two percent of the federal employment discrimination 
caseload in 1989"). A plaintiff bringing a disparate impact claim under Title VII must show that a facially 
neutral job requirement or policy has a disproportionate impact on a protected group and that the 
requirement or policy is not related to job performance. 42 U.S.c. § 2000e-2(k) (2000) (burden of proof 
in disparate impact cases); see, e.g., Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 331-33 (1977). Unlike in a 
disparate treatment claim, once a plaintiff shows disparate impact, the burden shifts to the employer to 
either refute the elements of the plaintiff's case, or demonstrate that the facially neutral requirement or 
policy is justified by a business necessity. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971). 
59. Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, Working Identity, 85 CORNEll.. L. REv. 1259, 1260-61 
(2000) (explaining that in attempting to "signal" difficult-to-observe identity characteristics, i.e., to perform 
identity, individuals in the workplace "have an incentive to work their identities in ways that suggest to the 
employer what otherwise might not be readily apparent," e.g., by mentioning in casual conversation with 
a co-worker how tired one is from working late the night before, or by sending a work-related email to a 
supervisor late at night to demonstrate the same); David Charny & G. Mitu Gulati, Efficiency-Wages, 
Tournaments, and Discrimination: A Theory of Employment Discrimination Law for "High-Level" Jobs, 
33 HARv. c.R.-c.L. L. REv. 57, 89-95 (1998) (developing, in part, an economic analysis of employment 
discrimination that "shows how discrimination perpetuates itself, in part, by influencing the career 
strategies that workers adopt in response to discrimination" and "explains the interaction between strategies 
that workers adopt and corresponding modes of evaluation (e.g., in responding to noisy signals)"); see also 
Gertrud M. Fremling & Richard A. Posner, Status Signaling and the Law, with Particular Application to 
Sexual Harassment, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 1069, 1069-70 (1999) (discussing generally the phenomenon of 
"status signaling"). 
60. Carbado & Gulati, supra note 59, at 1262. 
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One of the hypotheticals Carbado and Gulati use to demonstrate their 
thesis that "performing identity is work," involves a first-year, black, male law 
professor teaching about Terry stops in a criminal procedure course.61 In this 
regard, they explore the professor's "subject unrest,,,62 stating that "[t]he 
possibility exists that stereotypes ... will be at odds with stated or unstated 
criteria that (he thinks) the institution values.,,63 Thus, the first-year black law 
professor, in making his pedagogical choices about whether to use the Socratic 
method or alternate forms of teaching-such as small group work or 
lecturing-must consider racial scripting in a way that his white male 
colleagues do not. Even if he wants to use small groups or to lecture on some 
topics because he has carefully considered the pedagogical value of those 
teaching methods over the Socratic method, he must consider and risk whether 
choosing to employ them will result in the reinforcing of stereotypes-of his 
being disorganized, intellectually soft, and lacking in rigor-that students and 
colleagues might attach to him as a black man using alternate teaching 
methods.64 If the professor decides to explicitly discuss race in his teaching 
of the Terry doctrine in his criminal procedure class, he also must consider 
and risk whether doing so will result in teaching evaluations, especially at 
institutions where the student body is mostly white, that fault him for being 
"obsessed with race" and, thus, not objective.65 
Carbado and Gulati also deepen Gotanda' s critique of colorblindness, 
defining the "colorblind norm" as one where "whites cannot intentionally 
discriminate against people of color based on race .... The colorblind idea 
does not, however, place an affirmative duty on whites to interact with people 
of color, or a negative duty to dissociate and disidentify themselves from 
whites.,,66 Here, they use a law firm lunch hypothetical, where a group of 
Latina/o associates having lunch together appears to insiders as racially 
clannish, non-collegial, and "undermining [of] the law firm's colorblind 
ideal,,,67 whereas a group of white associates lunching together piques very 
61. [d. at 1279-88. 
62. "Subject unrest" refers, in part, to "the tension between first·person and third-person accounts 
of the world-between the 'objective' and the 'subjective, '" and to ''the problem of identity." Culp et aI., 
supra note 43, at 2436-37. 
63. Carbado & Gulati, supra note 59, at 1279-80. Specifically, the hypothetical demonstrates all 
the "extra" work the professor must do in choosing to use the Socratic teaching method and in teaching 
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. I (1968). See id. at 1279-88. 
64. [d. at 1281-83. Anecdotally, this is extra identity work that many women also incur. 
65. [d. at 1283-84. 
66. [d. at 1285-86. 
67. [d. at 1286. 
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little i1erest at all, positive or negative. The important point here relates to 
the unitlirectional nature of the colorblind norm: 
The colorblind norm does not require whites to avoid other whites or to associate with 
people of color. This norm does, however, require people of color to avoid other people 
of color (the negative racial duty) and to associate with whites (the affirmative racial 
dutyf In fact, the colorblind norm operates as a color conscious burden. Colorblindness, 
therefore, does not actually mean colorblindness. Specifically, it racially regulates the 
workplace association of people of color, but not those of white people. A colorblind 
workplace norm requires people of color, but not white people, to think and be careful 
about their racial associations.68 
Therein lies the extra work of colorblindness, particularly with respect to 
employees of color in predominantly white work environments.69 
While Carbado and Gulati limit their discussions of working identity 
theory to the ways in which it negatively impacts people of color and women, 
the difficulties of performing one's identity can also attach to insiders who 
have aligned themselves with perceived outsider "issues." Recognizing this 
possibility is important because it demonstrates how whiteness, maleness, and 
straightness are also socially constructed categories of race, gender, and 
sexuality, and how the construction of these insider categories feeds cultural 
hegemony. Take, for example, Andrew, a white, straight male whose teaching 
and scholarly interests are in family law, constitutional law, critical race 
theory, and feminist legal theory. Andrew is a second-year law professor at 
a law school whose students are predominantly white, and whose faculty is 
predominantly white and male. Because of the general disinterest of other 
faculty members, Andrew advises the Black Law Students Association. Also, 
because there is no corresponding association for gay, lesbian" bisexual, and 
trans gender law students, Andrew has affixed a rainbow sticker to the outside 
of his door, to signal his openness to and support of students who are sexual 
outsiders at the school. 
68. [d. at 1287-88. 
69. In their paper, Carbado& Gulati also discuss some "[a]dditional costs of working identity," such 
as: the practice of identity denial, whereby people of color negotiate their racial identities for the express 
purpose (in their minds) of ensuring that insiders feel at ease around them; the compromising of one's self-
identity as less "political" in order to signal a negation to insiders of stereotypes of the strident minority; 
and the dilemma of what to do about racial humor, which, based upon the reaction of the outsider employee, 
can mark her as overly sensitive and not a team player. [d. at 1288-91. Moreover, they describe the risks 
involved in working identity, as "[i]dentity performances can backfire," particularly in light of the fact that 
many stereotypes attaching to, for example, Asians are interconnected. [d. at 1291. For example, if a black 
woman attempts to negate a stereotype of laziness by working extra long hours at the law firm, insiders 
might attach the flipside stereotype that the reason she must work so many hours is because she is 
intellectually incompetent. See id. at 1292. 
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Obviously, because of his commitment to diversity and the apparent 
disinterest in diversity on the part of his colleagues, Andrew is already doing 
extra identity-related work in that he is advising several student groups and 
individual students, on top of his teaching, scholarship, and other institutional 
service. Moreover, because the dean of the school is concerned about 
recruiting more minority, female, and/or gay and lesbian faculty-in small 
part so that the burden of the work Andrew is doing can be spread around a 
bit-the dean has assigned Andrew to the faculty appointments committee, 
widely regarded as the school's most "powerful" and work-heavy committee. 
Based on Andrew's assignment to this committee so early in his career, a few 
of his senior colleagues begin to suspect his political relationship with the 
dean. Moreover, they cannot understand why Andrew chooses to commit time 
and energy to issues relating to race, gender, and sexuality. By virtue of his 
political alignment with people of color, women, and sexual minorities, 
Andrew is soon marked as an outsider himself, as probably gay and as a sort 
of "race [and gender] traitor,,70 (although he is not explicitly termed as such). 
Finally, that Andrew would choose to engage in this kind of work, instead of 
devoting more time to his scholarship, will probably not help his case when 
it comes time for him to apply for promotion and/or tenure. 
In terms of identity scripting, Andrew could have performed his white 
male identity rather successfully in myriad ways without incurring the kind of 
risk he has now incurred through his outsider alignment. Unlike people of 
color and women, for example, who are expected stereotypically to teach and 
write in a few areas and to commit to certain institutional priorities,11 Andrew 
could have chosen to teach almost anything in the curriculum including 
courses like family law, feminist jurisprudence, and/or critical race theory. 
However, having chosen to teach and write in all of those areas, Andrew is 
now excepted as an "Other," defeating the presumption that he is an insider. 
And, although due to his alignments Andrew must perform much of the extra 
identity work that outsiders are expected (and often want) to do, he probably 
still does not have to consider whether his breaking his students into small 
groups in class will reinforce a stereotype of intellectual softness or laziness 
because such stereotypes do not attach to white male professors. The key 
difference between Andrew, an aligned outsider, and "immutable" outsiders, 
70. See RACE TRAITOR 9-14 (Noel Ignatiev & John Garveyeds., 1996) (arguing that whiteness is 
socially constructed to perpetuate racial dominance and, thus, should be dismantled in favor of a "New 
Abolitionism" movement). 
71. For example, women are often expected to teach and/or write in the areas of family law, 
employment discrimination, and/or feminist legal theory. 
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is that his conduct dictates his designated status as outsider, rather than his 
status dictating his conduct, which is generally the case for immutable 
outsiders. 
Thus, identity work burdens outsiders and, to a lesser extent, insiders 
aligned with pre-designated outsider interests, not only in that this work 
requires them to do more on a physical, mental, and emotional level, but also 
because it causes them to incur work and identity-related risks that their 
insider counterparts do not incur.72 The shaping of workplace incentives to 
perform or counter-perform one's scripted identity are at the heart of Carbado 
and Gulati' s work. Their most important intervention occurs when they argue 
that "both the nature of the work and the pressure to do it, the 'working 
identity' phenomenon, is a form of employment discrimination.'173 They 
critique the law's failure thus far to recognize this form of discrimination and 
for its failure to distinguish between discrimination based on racial status, the 
linchpin of our current antidiscrimination paradigm, and that based on racial 
conduct.74 Carbado and Gulati state: 
[T]o the extent that antidiscrimination law ignores identity work, it will not be able to 
address 'racial conduct' discrimination. Racial conduct discrimination derives, not 
simply from the fact that an employee is, for example, phenotypically Asian American 
(i.e., [his] racial status) but also from how [he] performs [his] Asian American identity 
in the workplace (i.e., [his] racial conduct).75 
Understanding the difference between discrimination based on racial 
status and that based on racial conduct is key to understanding how Carbado 
and Gulati' s working identity theory addresses the material and 
ideological-the de jure and de facto-aspects of Young's theory of 
oppression.76 Young's theorizing of the marginalized and powerless as those 
who must "prove their respectability" because of the status they occupy,77 
parallels Carbado and Gulati' s theory of working identity. Both theories seek 
to problematize the meaning of discrimination by exposing cultural and social 
linkages between, in the case of a person of color, her racial 
conduct--conduct that is always susceptible to comparison with a set of 
72. See Carbado & Gulati, supra note 59, at 1262. 
73. [d. (emphasis added). 
74. [d. at 1262-63. 
75. [d. 
76. For an excellent analysis of related theories of sex-specific trait discrimination, see Kimberly 
A. Yuracko, Trait Discrimination as Sex Discrimination: An Argument Against Neutrality, 83 TEx. L. 
REv. 167 (2004). 
77. YOUNG, supra note II, at 58. 
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presumed outsider stereotypes that are, in the end, never respectable-to her 
racial status, to which those stereotypes are attached in the flrst place. That 
a non-minority need not negotiate his racial status by altering his 
conduct-that he need not do (but could choose to do, as with Andrew) the 
extra identity work that a minority is expected to do--demonstrates just how 
normalized his culture and experiences are, and the extent to which 
workplaces function as colonized spaces.78 
In introducing their theory of working identity, Carbado and Gulati also 
address at some level all flve faces of Young's theory of injustice and 
oppression. But, as I have written elsewhere, I am not persuaded that equality 
can be achieved if civil rights law remains the only doctrinal fleld that 
expressly aspires to it.79 Thus, this Article pushes the boundaries of the 
important work from which it is derived, by asking: Can and should doctrinal 
flelds outside of the law of employment discrimination and traditional civil 
rights law aspire toward equality and the elimination of Young's flve faces of 
oppression? And is it appropriate for other areas of the law, particularly those 
areas regarded as "private," to do so? 
II. WHY CONSIDER PuBLIC LAW NORMS? 
In response to the questions just posed, this Article obviously responds 
affIrmatively. This Article's normative project, flrst taken up in Critical 
Interventions, posits that the good faith doctrine in contract law furnishes an 
ideal vehicle by which to test its feasibility, not only because of its deflnitional 
potential but also because of its substantive emptiness.80 Good faith can and 
7S. The colonized workspace refers to the complex and inherently hierarchical relationship between 
any worker/employee and the institution for which slhe works. As Said has written, specifically in the 
context of the role of the intellectual, this relationship is "never static but always evolving .... " EDWARD 
W. SAID, REpRESENTATIONS OF THE INTELLECfUAL 65 (1994). Said's description of the problematic 
relationship between the scholar-academic, hislher institution, andlor society-at-large is especially 
illuminating in this regard: 
[Tlhe question remains as to whether there is or can be anything like an independent, autonomously 
functioning intellectual, one who is not beholden to, and therefore constrained by, his or her 
affiliations with universities that pay salaries, political parties that demand loyalty to a party line, 
think tanks that while they offer freedom to do research perhaps more subtly compromise judgment 
and restrain the critical voice. 
Id. at 67-6S. 
79. See Critical Interventions, supra note 2, at 1095. 
SO. Doctrinally speaking, I have argued elsewhere that the good faith doctrine functions in modem 
contract law more as an analytical proxy for material breach analyses, than as an equitably implied 
obligation. See Houh, supra note I. 
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. should be salvaged, in part by loading it not only with existing notions of 
fundamental fairness and honesty in fact, but more generally with public law 
norms that call for the promotion of the model of equality described in Part I 
of this Article. The more general normative goal of infusing private law with 
public law norms is controversial to say the least, but not unprecedented. 
Critical Interventions discussed one set of justifications for the more specific 
goal of infusing contract law with equality norms; that is, it argued in part that 
the incorporation of the expansive equality norm into contract law is in part 
necessitated by the inability of conventional civil rights law to achieve 
substantive and more expansive notions of sociopolitical equality.sl This Part 
expands upon those and other justifications. 
That the implied obligation of good faith should be salvaged by 
incorporating it with equality norms should be considered seriously, in part 
because precedent exists for linking public law norms with the private law of 
contract. With respect to good faith in particular, this private/public law 
overlap has emerged in its pragmatic form as the claim for tortious breach of 
good faith claim, which is limited usually-to the extent such claims are 
recognized at all-to insurance cases. S2 The tortious breach of good faith 
claim, as well as the scholarly and doctrinal controversy over whether tort law 
should be considered private or public in nature, are discussed below. The 
more general controversy relating to the public/private distinction is discussed 
infra at Part II.B. 
A. The Tort-Contract Overlap 
Over the past five decades, scholarly debate has waxed and waned as to 
whether tort law, once regarded as belonging firmly to the realm of private 
law, is really "public law in disguise."s3 Traditionally, tort law was regarded 
as private law because it sought to remedy wrongs between individuals-as 
opposed to between an individual and the state-by compensating the 
aggrieved individual, who is empowered to bring suit, rather than by 
81. See Critical Interventions, supra note 2, at 1054-95. 
82. See Douglas G. Houser, Good Faith as a Matter of Law: The Insurance Company's Right To 
Be Wrong, 27 TORT & INS. L.J. 665, 665-66 (1992) (discussing the origination in California of bad faith 
tort in the insurance context, and noting that at the time of writing, "[t]hirty-five jurisdictions ... appear 
to recognize a first-party bad faith cause of action .... [while] [fjourteen states appear to have rejected first-
party 'bad-faith' claims"). 
83. See generally Leon Green, Tort Law Public Law in Disguise, (Pts. I & 11),38 TEx. L. REv.!' 
257 (1959-1960). 
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penalizing the tortfeasor.84 Some scholars began to recognize, however, that 
in compensating the aggrieved, judges and juries, through deciding cases and 
creating and applying tort rules, were in essence also creating social norms, 
standards, and duties to which citizens could be held, lest they be compelled 
to compensate those harmed by their breaches of these norms, standards, and 
duties.85 Unlike contractual duties, which for the most part are privately 
created and ordered by the parties to a particular transaction or series of 
transactions, tort duties are imposed on all members of society by the specter 
of the tort claim and judicially-awarded tort damages.86 Other scholars have 
exposed the fundamental role of justice and public policy in major tort law 
decisions, arguing that tort law is not simply a matter of doctrinal 
development, but of (sometimes explicit) public policy implementation.87 
Thus, many scholars began to re-characterize tort law as public law. 88 This 
Article follows the more contemporary approach and conceives of tort law as 
public law, or at the very least, quasi-public law. 
The late Professor Grant Gilmore most famously made the case, however 
tongue-in-cheek, for the linking of tort and contract law in The Death of 
Contract,89 which was based on a series oflectures Gilmore delivered at The 
Ohio State University Law School in 1970.90 In relevant part, through his 
deconstruction of foundational contracts texts such as Dean Langdell' s first 
casebook and Williston's first treatise on contracts, Gilmore argued that 
contract law "did not come as the natural result of a continuing case-law 
development.,,91 Rather, Gilmore argued that the likes of Langdell and 
Williston "invented" contract law in a rather pieced-together and post-modem 
fashion by making "industrious use of whatever bits and pieces of case law, 
84. See John c.P. Goldberg. Twentieth-Century Tort Theory, 91 GEO. LJ. 513,516-22 (2003) 
(describing the "traditional account" of tort law, and distinguishing tort from criminal law in that "the 
power to bring suit against an actor alleged to have ... [committed a tort] resided only in the person or 
entity who could claim to have been wrongfully injured as a result of the violation. rather than in other 
persons or a government official"); see also David V. Snyder, Private Lawmaking. 64 OHIO ST. LJ. 371, 
375 (2003) (referring to contract law. tort law, and the law of commercial transactions as "prime examples" 
of private law). 
85. See Goldberg, supra note 84, at 519-21. 
86. See generally id. at 516-21. 
87. See Green, supra note 83, at 269. 
88. Notably, one of the co-authors of a leading American contracts casebook recently characterized 
tort law as public law. See Charles L. Knapp, Taking Contracts Private: The Quiet Revolution in Contract 
Law, 71 FORDHAM L. REv. 761,765 (2002) (citing CHARLES L. KNAPP ET AL., PROBLEMS IN CONTRACT 
LAw 3 (4th ed. 1999)). 
89. GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT (Ronald K.L. Collins ed., 2d ed. 1995). 
90. [d. at xxxi. 
91. [d. at 19. 
HeinOnline -- 66 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 477 2004-2005
2005] CRITICAL RACE REALISM 477 
could be made to fit the theory."92 Gilmore further argued that those like 
Langdell stamped these cases with the imprimatur of authority by labeling 
(and teaching) them as the "leading cases.,,93 Gilmore's deconstruction of 
those leading cases and the doctrines and issues they had come to 
represent-for example, consideration, modification, irrevocable offers, 
mistake, and promissory estoppel-remains brilliantly illuminating (and 
highlyentertaining).94 But, most significantly, Gilmore's analysis continues 
to call into question the sharp lines we have drawn between private and public 
law, particularly with respect to contract and tort law. Has contract doctrine, 
in part through its pervasive incorporation of reliance principles and theories, 
been (re-)absorbed by tort law? Should it? If not, should contract scholars 
continue to brighten the line between contract law and tort law, or should 
attempts be made to blur the line in particular places? Have the courts 
explicitly addressed these questions and, if so, how? 
In Story v. City of Bozeman,95 the Supreme Court of Montana explicitly 
attempted to respond to some of these questions and gave some mixed 
answers. As in so many contractor disputes, the breakdown in the relationship 
between the plaintiff -contractor and the defendant-owner began with an error 
in the bidding specifications issued by the defendant on which the plaintiff 
had relied in putting together his winning bid. The owner maintained that the 
contractor knew or should have known about the error and, as such, refused 
to make any upward modification on the contract price, as demanded by the 
contractor. Further disputes eventually arose over the quality of the 
contractor's work and, ultimately, the owner terminated the contract.96 The 
contractor then filed suit alleging breach of contract, bad faith, and defamatory 
conduct on the part of the owner.97 
At trial, the jury found that the owner had breached the implied covenant 
of good faith and fair dealing and awarded the contractor tort damages for 
breach of good faith in an amount that was more than twenty-five times what 
it awarded on the breach of contract claim.98 This disparity in the tort and 
contract damages caused the state's high court to become concerned that "the 
'tort tail' ha[d] begun to wag the 'contract dog"'; thus, it embarked on a 
92. [d. 
93. See id. 
94. See id. at 39-93. 
95. Story v. City of Bozeman, 791 P.2d 767 (Mont. 1990). 
96. [d. at 769. 
97. [d. 
98. [d. at 772. 
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thorough review of the law in order "to make mid-course corrections. ,,99 The 
court traced the development of the tortious bad faith claim, which is 
significantly different from the contractual bad faith claim in that punitive or 
tort damages, and not just contractual expectation damages, may be awarded 
for tortious breach of good faith. tOO The claim for tortious breach of good 
faith originated in (and in most states recognizing such a claim is restricted to) 
the insurance context. 101 The court then observed that, like some other states 
recognizing tortious bad faith claims in the insurance context, Montana had 
extended the tort of breach of good faith both to employment/wrongful 
discharge cases, as well as to cases involving a "special relationship" as 
between the contracting parties. IOO But, in Nicholson v. United Pacific 
Insurance Co., 103 decided five years before Story, the Montana Supreme Court 
went further than any other jurisdiction by extending the bad faith tort claim 
to "typical arms-length contracts."I04 
Noting that the court, through Nicholson, had taken a position on tortious 
good faith that had out-reached even California's (then) position, the court 
reviewed the many ways in which the Montana courts and legislature had 
begun to delimit and deter "over-use" of the tortious bad faith claim.105 For 
example, in the at-will employment context, courts allowed tortious bad faith 
claims only when "the employer's objective manifestations give the employee 
a reasonable belief that he or she has job security."106 In the insurance 
context, bad faith claims based on the insurer's alleged refusal to settle had to 
"await determination of the underlying liability issue to prevent prejudice to 
the insurer.,,107 Also, as a general matter, the court had held that the implied 
obligation of good faith and fair dealing could not be breached unless there 
was also a breach of contract. 108 Finally, the Montana legislature banned 
99. Id. 
100. See Matthew 1. Barrett, Note, "Contort": Tortious Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good 
Faith and Fair Dealing in Noninsurance. Commercial Contracts-Its Existence and Desirability, 60 
NOTRE DAME L. REv. 510, 510-11 (1985). 
101. Courts developed the tortious bad faith claim to enable insureds to sue their insurers for abusive 
claims settlement practices, particularly because, as a matter of industry custom, insurers contractually 
reserved in their policies absolute discretionary authority over such settlement practices. Story v. City of 
Bozeman, 791 P.2d 773 (Mont. 1990) (citations omitted). 
102. Id. (citations omitted). 
103. Nicholson v. United Pacific Ins. Co., 710 P.2d 1342, 1348 (Mont. 1985). 
104. Story, 791 P.2d at 773 (citations omitted). 
105. Id. at 774-75. 
106. Id. at 774. 
107. Id. at 775. 
108. Id. 
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punitive/tort damages with respect to claims arising out of breach of contract 
and statutorily adopted a vee definition of good faith that required "honesty 
in fact and the observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing 
in the trade."I09 
Based on this history, the Story court limited the position taken by the 
Nicholson court before it, and held that: "In common contract actions, tort-
type damages are not available for breach of the implied covenant of good 
faith andfair dealing. They are, however, available for traditional contract-
related torts such as fraud, fraudulent inducement, and tortious interference 
with a contract." I 10 In addition to these contract-related torts, the court held 
that tort damages would still be available for breach of good faith claims in 
"exceptional circumstances," such as with respect to contracts involving 
"special relationships." III 
Story represents the majority position that, outside of "contorts" such as 
fraudulent inducement, misrepresentation, and tortious interference, tortious 
bad faith claims are limited to "special relationship" contracts cases, which 
might involve insurers and insureds, employers and employees, and fiduciaries 
and beneficiaries. The court's tracing of the tortious bad faith claim's history 
and its categorical approach to such claims illuminate the tort-contract 
overlap. The Story court's discussion of well-established contort claims and 
its restriction of other tortious bad faith claims to those involving special 
relationships not only acknowledges the historical linkages between tort and 
contract claims, but also reveals the core difference between the tort and 
contract claim based on thesame set of facts: the extent of available damages. 
The problem with awarding tort damages for contract claims, according to the 
court and numerous commentators, is that "the specter of tort damages upsets 
the concept of efficient breach."112 Numerous other scholars, however, have 
critiqued the concept of efficient breach, particularly as it relates to the 
availability of tort damages in breach of contract cases involving emotional 
distress. 113 
109. Id. 
110. Id. at 776 (emphasis added). 
111. Id. 
112. Id. at 774. "Efficient breach" occurs when: 
in some cases a party ... break[s] his contract simply because his profit from breach would exceed 
his profit from completion of the contract. If it would also exceed the expected profit to the other 
party from completion of the contract, and if damages are limited to the loss of that profit, there will 
be an incentive to commit a breach. But there should be; it is an efficient breach. 
RICHARD A. PoSNER, EcONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw 120 (6th ed. 2003). 
113. See, e.g., Charlotte K. Goldberg, Emotional Distress Damages and Breach a/Contract: A New 
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A fuller discussion of the scholarly debate over whether allowing tort 
damages for breach of contract claims really "upsets" efficient breach is 
beyond the scope of this Article. However, the relevant insight derived from 
this debate is that breaches of contracts may in fact impact contracting parties 
in meaningful but non-monetary ways. That is, breaches of contract may 
cause emotional distress to aggrieved parties, they may affect how parties 
view themselves and their counter-parties as part of larger commercial, social, 
and/or political communities, and they may impact the culture of particular 
contracting communities.1l4 Put another way, breaches of contract-
particularly those that are based on breaches of the duty of good faith-may 
have public as well as private effects. And, if that is the case, why should 
common law contract doctrine, as a matter of theory, exclude the 
contemplation of public law norms? 
B. Legal Realism and the Break-down of the Public/Private Distinction 
Scholars and commentators have been interrogating and challenging the 
purportedly sharp categorical divide between public and private law since, at 
the latest, the early 1900s. In effecting their critiques of the public/private 
distinction in the 1920s and 1930s, legal realists like Robert Hale and Morris 
Cohen paid particular attention to property and contract law, which then (as 
now) represented the classically entrenched conception of private law. 115 
Approach, 20 U.c. DAVIS L. REv. 57 (1986) (indicating that tort damages should be available in breach 
of contract cases where contract involves emotional subjects, but not when contract is purely commercial 
and profit-making); Amy H. Kastely, Compensation for Lost Aesthetic and Emotional Enjoyment: A 
Reconsideration of Contract Damages for Nonpecuniary Loss, 8 U. HAw. L. REv. 1 (1986) (advancing the 
argument that contractual expectation damages encompass recovery for emotional distress); John A. Sebert, 
Jr., Punitive and Nonpecuniary Damages in Actions Based upon Contract: Toward Achieving the 
Objective of Full Compensation, 33 UCLA L. REV. 1565 (1986) (arguing that economic analysis 
demonstrates that denying emotional distress damages in breach of contract actions is unsound because it 
allows a breaching party to avoid the full costs of his breach, thus producing "inefficient breach"); Douglas 
J. Whaley, Paying for the Agony: The Recovery of Emotional Distress Damages in Contract Actions, 26 
SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 935 (1992) (advocating that special rules limiting recovery of damages for emotional 
distress in breach of contract actions should be dropped in favor of general requirements of foreseeability 
and proof with reasonable certainty). 
114. Professor Robin Paul Malloy has developed a semiotic model of market analysis that emphasizes 
market incentives and disincentives focusing on the politics, community, and culture of market actors, 
rather than the maximization of (a Kaldor-Hicks model of) efficiency. See ROBIN PAUL MALLOY, LAw AND 
MARKET EcONOMY: REINTERPRETING THE VALUES OF LAw AND EcONOMICS (2000). 
115. See generally Morris R. Cohen, The Basis of Contract, 46 HARV. L. REV. 553 (1933); Robert 
L. Hale, Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-Coercive State, 38 POL. SCI. Q. 470 (1923). 
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In his seminal The Basis of Contract, Professor Cohen took on the 
classical roots of contractualism, which he described as: 
the view that in an ideally desirable system of law all obligation would arise only out of 
the will of the individual contracting freely, [which view in turn] rests not only on the 
will theory of contract but also on the political doctrine that all restraint is evil and that 
the government is best which governs least. 1l6 
Cohen's critiques of will theory and contractualism are replete with ideas that 
now proliferate the contemporary work of critical and non-critical scholars, 
and in particular, of those who continue to challenge the now all-pervasive 
conventional economic analysis of law.lI7 Cohen wrote: 
It was natural for the representatives of the growing commercial and industrial interests 
to view the state, controlled as it had been by landed barons and prelates ... , as 
exclusively an instrument of oppression, and necessarily evil. But their argument 
overshot its mark. They forgot that not only industry but also the whole life of 
civilization depends on the feeling of security that the protection of the government or 
organized community affords. 
The philosophy of freedom or liberty illustrates one of the most pervasive and 
persistent vices of reasoning on practical affairs, to wit, the setting up of premises that 
are too wide for our purpose and indefensible on their own account. IIB 
Cohen went on to criticize a broad range of liberal philosophical defenses to 
contractualism and exposed and exalted the essential public function of 
contract law: "to standardize conduct by penalizing departures from the legal 
norm," both through the awarding of damages or specific performance, as well 
as through the declaration of certain contracts as void or voidable. 119 
In 1923, Robert Hale in his famous Coercion and Distribution in a 
Supposedly Non-Coercive State more specifically began to deconstruct the 
public/private distinction by revealing the ways in which legal and 
philosophical discourse had, up to then, obscured the private aspects of 
116. Cohen, supra note 115, at 558 (emphasis added). 
117. See, e.g., MALLOY, supra note 114; Ian Ayres, Never Confuse Efficiency with a Liver 
Complaint, 1997 WIS. L. REv. 503, 504-06 (1997) (describing the "hegemony of economic analysis" in 
law); Gillian K. Hadfield, An Expressive Theory of Contract: From Feminist Dilemmas to a 
Reconceptualization of Rational Choice in Contract Law, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1235 (1998) (applying 
reconception of "rational choice" theory to effect a feminist economic analysis of contract law); Duncan 
Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARv. L. REV. 1685, 1740-53, 1762-66, 
1776 (1976) (arguing that economic principles embedded in legal rules and standards are "instrumental to 
the pursuit of substantive objectives"). 
118. Cohen, supra note 115, at 559 (emphasis added). 
119. [d. at 589. 
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coercion, while simultaneously vilifying its public aspects. 120 To Hale, threats 
and promises, whether public in the form of state regulation, or private in the 
form of negotiated (or un-negotiated) contracts, were both coercive in an 
amoral sense because both function to influence a person's conduct in positive 
and negative ways. \21 To Hale, what made the difference was power. Hale's 
analysis of wealth distribution focused not on the coercive nature of public 
regulation and private exchange transactions, but on whether power was 
concentrated in the hands of private or public actors. Hale wrote: 
If [the] distinctions [between immorally coercive threats and moral promises] are all 
invalid, then, ... it seems to follow that the inc<)me of each person in the community 
depends on the relative strength of his power of coercion, offensive and defensive .... 
This power is frequently highly centralized, with the result that the worker is frequently 
deprived, during working hours and even beyond, of all choice over his own activities. 
To take this control by law from the owner of the plant and to vest 'it in public 
officials or in a guild or in a union organization elected by the workers would neither 
add to nor subtract from the constraint which is exercised with the aid of the 
government. It would merely transfer the constraining power to a different set of 
persons. It might result in greater or in less actual power of free initiative all around, but 
this sort of freedom is not to be confused with the "freedom" which means absence of 
governmental constraint. 122 
Hale's articulation of the distinction between "power of free initiative all 
around" and the neo-liberal conception of freedom is striking in that it 
prefigured theories of the circulative nature of power, which are so 
foundational to cultural studies. 123 Moreover, such theories of how power 
circulates give rise to a question that underlies, in part, this portion of the 
Article: to the extent that American jurisprudence maintains the distinction 
between public and private law, how does line-drawing by courts, 
commentators, and scholars between the public and the private domains 
impact distributions of power and, consequently, economic and sociopolitical 
equality? 
120. Hale, supra note llS,at471-78. 
121. [d. at 471-79. 
122. [d. at 477-78 (emphasis added). 
123. See Stuart Hall, The Work of Representation, in REpRESENTATION: CULTURAL 
REpRESENTATIONS AND SIGNIFYING PRACTICES 41-51 (Stuart Hall ed., 1997) (discussing circulative nature 
of discourse and its relationship to knowledge, truth, and power in society). 
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The triumphs of the legal realism movement were many,124 but the 
continued entrenchment of the distinction between public and private law 
remains as one of the movement's greatest failures. Claiming, for example, 
as Professor Clare Dalton has that "the Realist challenge to the 'privateness' 
of contract has been assimilated and defused," 125 feminist, critical, and liberal 
scholars, among others, attempted to make concentrated interventions to 
resuscitate the debate over the public/private distinction in the early to mid-
1980s.'26 Notably, in 1985, Professor Dalton challenged the "privateness of 
contract" in her controversial An Essay in the Reconstruction of Contract 
Doctrine. 127 There, she asserted that "all contracts are public.,,'28 She 
supported this claim by re-analyzing quasi-contract, or implied-in-Iaw 
contract, alongside implied in-fact-contract, pointing out that both functioned 
to impose "social norms" on individual parties in order "to create a public 
obligation.,,'29 Dalton also re-examined the doctrines of unconscionability, 
duress, the parol evidence rule, consideration, and reliahce. '3o In all of these 
contexts, she, like Professor Duncan Kennedy,131 deconstructed the modem 
notion of "objectivity"-of the purported difference between form and 
substance-in the law. '32 Moreover, Dalton made central to her inquiry the 
questions of knowledge and power. She asked explicitly: 
124. Legal realism's most significant triumph was the adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code 
by every state in the country, except Louisiana. David V. Snyder, Private Lawmaking, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 
371, 379 (2003). Its chief architect, Karl Uewellyn, was among the most important and well-known of the 
Realists. He argued that commercial law developed into its modem, stabilized state not because it 
embodied and formalistically enacted a set of legal rules, but because particularized social and economic 
circumstances compelled the judicial creation of a body of law that developed into a coherent doctrine. See 
Note, 'Round and 'Round the Bramble Bush: From Legal Realism to Critical Legal Scholarship, 95 
HARv. L. REv. 1669, 1671-73 (1982) (discussing Karl Uewellyn, On Warranty of Quality, and Society, 
36 COLUM. L. REV. 699 (1936), and Karl Uewellyn, On Wa"anty of Quality, and Society: 11,37 COLUM. 
L. REv. 341 (1937». 
125. Dalton, supra note 3, at 1014. 
126. See, e.g., Mary Ann Glendon, The Transformation of American Landlord-Tenant Law, 23 S.c. 
L. REV. 503 (1982) (tracing the development of landlord-tenant law from its historical roots in private law 
of contract, to its publicly regulated form); Symposium, The PubliC/Private Distinction, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 
1289 (1982) (discussing this symposium on the publidprivate distinction in law, featuring papers on topics 
such as the history of the distinction, state action and liberal theory, and distinction in the contexts of labor 
law and corporate law). 
127. Dalton, supra note 3. 
128. Id. at 1001. 
129. Id. 
130. Id. at 1024-95. 
131. See generally Kennedy, supra note 117. 
132. Dalton, supra note 3, at 1042-54. 
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Why do we allow our decisionmakers to conduct their search for answers to concrete 
human problems in this particular form [that is, in the form dictated by particular legal 
rules relating to the subjects mentioned above]? .. In the name of understanding ofthe 
human condition do our judges exert authority over us in our interactions with others? 
In the name of what understanding of the human condition do we allow ourselves to be 
thus constrained in imagining the possibilities of relationship with others?133 
Thus, as exemplified by the work of Dalton, Kennedy, Hale, and Cohen, most 
of the scholarship interrogating the public/private distinction has focused on 
dismantling the mythic categories of public and private law. 
Additionally, in recent years, some scholars interested in the 
public/private distinction have begun to re-direct their theoretical and 
doctrinal inquiries. 134 The focal shift being effected by these scholars is an 
extraordinarily important one, gi ven the global proliferation of American-style 
capitalism and the political and economic trend toward privatization of 
institutions and systems historically regarded as essentially public (such as 
prisons, primary education, etc.). Along these lines, Professor Jody Freeman 
has advocated the extension of public law norms through privatization. She 
writes: 
Instead of seeing privatization as a. means of shrinking government, I imagine it as a 
mechanism for expanding government's reach into realms traditionally thought private. 
In other words, privatization can be a means of "publicization," through which private 
actors increasingly commit themselves to traditionally public goals as the price of access 
to lucrative opportunities to deliver goods and services that might otherwise be provided 
directly by the state. So, rather than compromising democratic norms of accountability, 
due process, equality, and rationality-as some critics of privatization fear it 
will-privatization might extend these norms to private actors through vehicles such as 
budgeting, regulation, and contract. 135 
Freeman's work focuses on why and how the government should require 
adherence to public law norms as part of the consideration for its contracts 
and, as such, on the "relationship between administrative law and the role 
private actors play in public governance.,,136 Freeman further frames her 
analysis as one incorporating what she calls "the public law perspective," 
which is concerned not primarily with "whether privatization is efficient, but 
133. /d. at 1003. 
134. See, e.g., Jody Freeman, Extending Public Law Norms Through Privatization. 116 HARv. L. 
REv. 1285 (2003) (diSCUSSed infra pp.28-29); Snyder. supra note 124. at 371 (arguing that because a 
significant amount oflaw is privately made. such law should be Subjected to the same kinds of questioning 
as publicly made law). 
135. Freeman. supra note 134. at 1285. 
136. [d. at 1288. 
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whether it erodes the public law norms that ... constitutional and statutory 
limits are designed to protect.,,13? 
This Article merges the approaches of the legal realists and their critical 
descendants with those of more pragmatic scholars, like Freeman, who are 
attempting to re-order internally the goals of privatization. This attempt at 
such merger is not nearly so radical as it might sound, for entire sub-categories 
of contract law, such as in the insurance, consumer, labor, and landlord/tenant 
contexts, are regulated quite heavily by federal and state legislatures. This 
Article merely seeks to effect the "publicization" of the private law of contract 
vis-a-vis the application of the good faith doctrine, with the specific and 
explicit goal of eliminating racial and gender subordination. Doctrinally, the 
implied obligation of good faith is the ideal vehicle for such publicization, 
given its murky definitional contours and, as I have argued elsewhere, given 
its currently hollow doctrinal state. 138 Theoretically, it makes sense to use the 
implied obligation of good faith to these ends, because implied contractual 
obligations arise for the very purpose of effecting and prescribing certain 
cultural and social norms between contracting parties, which norms are 
transmitted and enforced by the courts as both a descriptive and normative 
matter. In that sense, implied obligations are in their very nature public 
obligations, and, if that is so, then they should incorporate public law norms. 
Thus, in borrowing from the classic legal realist controversy over the public-
private distinction to incorporate a public law norm of equality, defined 
critically into contract law, this Article advocates a form of critical race theory 
that it calls critical race realism. 
ill. THE INADEQUACIES OF SECTION 1981 OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS 
ACT OF 1866 
In enacting sections 1981 and 1982 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 
Congress expressed its commitment to equality in contracting, not only as 
between an individual and the state but also as between private individuals. 
This historical commitment to racial equality in public and private contracting 
provides some precedent for my proposed good faith discrimination claim, but 
would such a claim simply duplicate the remedies offered by section 1981? 
This Part argues that because section 1981 offers only very limited remedies 
to those harmed by inequality in contracting, the good faith discrimination 
137. /d. at 1302. 
138. See Houh, supra note 1. 
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claim not only would not be duplicative of the section 1981 claim, but also 
would go far to address the forms of domination and oppression discussed in 
Part I of this Article. 
A. A Primer on Section 1981 
Section 1981 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 provides in relevant part 
that: "All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the 
same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts ... as 
is enjoyed by white citizens."139 In 1991, Congress amended section 1981 to 
overrule Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, a Supreme Court case that 
restricted then-section 1981' s applicability to discrimination arising only from 
the formation of the original contract. 140 The 1991 amendments substantially 
broadened section 1981's post-Patterson scope by adding to it subsections (b) 
and (c), which, according to the amendments' legislative history, collectively 
overrule Patterson in its entirety!41 Specifically, subsection (b) defines 
"make and enforce contracts" to include "the making, performance, 
modification, and termination of contracts" and subsection (c) provides that 
"[t]he rights protected by this section are protected against impairment by 
nongovernmental discrimination and impairment under color of State law." 142 
139. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2000). 
140. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989). In Patterson, the plaintiff, Brenda 
Patterson, a black woman, brought a claim against her former employer under section 1981, alleging 
harassment, failure to promote, and termination based on her race. [d. at 169. Her claim failed at every 
level, and the Supreme Court, in a five-four decision, held that the language, "to ... enforce contracts," was 
to be interpreted narrOWly. [d. at 180-S1. Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, stated that "the right 
to make contracts does not extend, as a matter of either logic or semantics, to conduct by the employer after 
the contract relation has been established, including breach of the terms of the contract or imposition of 
discriminatory working conditions." [d. at 177. To be extra clear about section 19S1's narrow scope as 
a civil rights statute, he further stated that section 1981 is not to be employed or read as "a general 
proscription of racial discrimination." [d. at lSI. As such, the Court held that racial harassment is not 
actionable under section 1981. [d. at 182. However, the Court did leave open the possibility that 
Ms. Patterson's section 1981 claim for failure to promote was actionable, leaving to the lower court the 
question of whether the expectations under the new position were sufficiently different in nature so as to 
justify a "new and distinct relation" between Patterson and her former employer and, thus, the formation 
of a new contract between them. [d. at 185. 
141. According to the legislative history, one purpose of the Act was "to respond to recent decisions 
of the Supreme Court by expanding the scope of relevant civil rights statutes in order to provide adequate 
protection to victims of discrimination." Civil Rights Act of IS66 Amendments, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 
§ 3(4),1991 Stat. 1745 (1991). 
142. 42 U.S.C. § 19S1(b), (c) (2000). 
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Since the mid-1970s, when the Supreme Court held that section 1981 
applies to the making and enforcement of private as well as public contracts, 143 
section 1981 has been used most extensively as an alternative to, or in 
conjunction with, Title VIII44 in employment discrimination cases. By its 
terms, however, section 1981, unlike Title VII, is limited to racial 
discrimination. 145 Historically, though, section 1981 has offered some 
procedural and remedial advantages over Title VII. For example, under 
section 1981, a plaintiff may sue any employer, not just one with fifteen or 
more employees, as required under Title VII.146 Also, an employee may bring 
suit against an employer without having exhausted her administrative 
remedies by first filing a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission, as she is required to do under Title VII.147 Additionally, the 
statute of limitations for a 1981 claim, which is usually borrowed from an 
applicable state statute or, if the claim was made possible after 1990, is four 
years,148 which runs longer than the 180 or 300 day EEOC filing requirement 
under Title VII. 149 Under section 1981, plaintiffs also can request jury trials, 
whereas, under Title VII, they historically could not. In terms of remedies, 
plaintiffs also preferred remedies that have always been available under 
section 1981 but were not historically available under Title VII, such as the 
recovery of compensatory and punitive damages. 150 However, in 1991, 
Congress amended Title VII, permitting plaintiffs not only to request jury 
trials, but also to recover compensatory and punitive damages in cases where 
the plaintiff could not recover under section 1981.151 
143. Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976). 
144. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2000e-17 (2000). 
145. 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a) (2000). Title VII prohibits discrimination based on race, color, religion, 
sex, or national origin. 42 U.S.C. § 20ooe-2 (2000). 
146. 42 U.S.c. § 2000e(b) (2000)( defining "employer" as "a person engaged in an industry affecting 
commerce who has fifteen or more employees"). 
147. 42 U.S.c. § 2000e-4 (2000). 
148. See Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 482 U.S. 656, 660 (1987) (holding that federal courts should 
select "the most appropriate or analogous state statute of limitations" for § 1981 claims); but see Jones v. 
R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 124 S. Ct. 1836, 1845 (2004) (holding that the § 1981 claim is governed by 
a federal "catch-all" four-year statute of limitations if claim was made possible by post-1990 enactment of 
such statute). 
149. 42 U.S.c. § 2000e-5(e)(1) (2000) (explaining that adverse actions occurring more than 300 days 
before the filing of an EEOC complaint are time-barred). 
150. Prior to the passage of the 1991 amendment to the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 198Ia(c) 
(2000), a plaintiff alleging a violation of Title VII could recover only back pay and front pay. Because back 
pay and front pay have historically been recognized as equitable relief under Title VII, neither party was 
entitled to ajury trial; Title VDclaims were tried to the bench. Lehman v. Nakshian, 453 U.S. 156 (1981). 
151. See 42 U.S.C. § 198Ia(c), a(a)(1) (2000). 
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Despite the differences between section 1981 and Title VII, the same 
critiques apply to both, as section 1981 case law has incorporated the 
McDonnell-Douglas burden-shifting framework imposed upon plaintiffs who 
bring disparate treatment or intentional discrimination claims under Title 
VII.152 This is especially so because unlike under Title VII, a plaintiff 
asserting a violation of section 1981 may not bring a disparate impact claim 
based on racially neutral policies that have a disparate racial impact; rather, 
a section 1981 plaintiff may only assert a claim of intentional or purposeful 
discrimination. 153 Thus, in order to assert a section 1981 claim, a plaintiff 
must show that: (1) she is a member of a racial minority group; (2) the 
defendant had an intent to discriminate; and (3) the discrimination concerned 
one or more of the activities enumerated in the text of section 1981 (that is, 
according to section 1981 (b), "the making, performance, modification, and 
termination of contracts and the enjoyment of all benefits, privileges, terms, 
and conditions of the contractual relationship,,).154 Moreover, because the 
McDonnell-Douglas burden-shifting framework applies to section 1981 
claims,155 once a plaintiff has established her prima facie case, the burden 
shifts to the defendant to rebut that claim simply by producing some legally 
sufficient evidence of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse 
treatment. 156 If the employer meets this burden of production, then the 
plaintiff must show by a preponderance of evidence that the legitimate reasons 
offered by the defendant were not its true reasons for the adverse treatment, 
but mere pretext. 157 Moreover, in order for a plaintiff to prevail on her pretext 
argument, she must show not only that the proferred reason is false, but that 
the discrimination is the "real" reason. 158 
152. See Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 186 (1989), superceded in pan by The 
Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(c) (2000) (explaining that the McDonnell-Douglas scheme 
of proof is applicable to § 1981 claims); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-05 (1973). 
153. See Gen. Bldg. Contractors Ass'n v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375, 391 (1982) (holding that 
§ 1981, like the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, "can be violated only by purposeful 
discrimination"); see also Mitchell v. DCX, Inc., 274 F. Supp. 2d 33, 44-45 (D.D.C. 2003) (holding that 
the disparate impact theory of discrimination is not available to plaintiff asserting violation of § 1981). 
154. 42 U.S.C. § 1981(b) (2000); see also O'Neill v. Gourmet Sys. of Minn., Inc., 213 F. Supp. 2d 
1012, 1016 (W.O. Wis. 2002). 
ISS. Patterson, 491 U.S. at 186. 
156. See Tex. Dep't ofCmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254-56 (1981). 
157. See id. at 255-56; McDonnell-Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804-05. 
158. See Evans v. Toys R Us-Ohio, Inc., 32 F. Supp. 2d 974,985 (S.D. Ohio 1999) ("[AJ reason 
cannot be proved to be a 'pretext for discrimination' unless it is shown both that the reason was false, and 
that discrimination was the real reason.") (quoting St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 512 n.4). 
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B. Critiques of Intentionality 
Critiques of antidiscrimination law's obsession with intentionality abound 
in critical race scholarship.159 Professor Angela Harris has perhaps best 
summarized the critique of the intentionalist model of discrimination, which 
reifies racial subordination by "mediat[ing] the tension between egalitarian 
ideals and status quo preservation": 
The essentially moralistic discourse of discrimination condemns the racialist ideologies 
that pervaded most of twentieth century law and public policy, but it has also placed a 
premium on proving individual intent to harm and distinguishing innocent victims from 
evil victimizers ... , [T]his model of discrimination ... works to identify intentional 
wrongdoers and demonstrable victims, but leaves untouched unconscious racism, 
everyday cognitive bias, and institutional structures that faithfully perpetuate patterns of 
racial subordination. As the legal structures that continue to disadvantage people of color 
become increasingly "race-neutral" in a constitutional sense, the moral model of 
discrimination facilitates both the denunciation of bigotry and the maintenance of 
existing distributions of wealth and power. l60 
This intentionalist model of discrimination, which itself derives from an 
individualist and neo-liberal model of equality, is associated in contemporary 
scholarship and commentary with the "racial realism" movement. 161 In 
general, racial realists advocate for the continued use of the colorblind 
approach to law- and policy-making, an approach Neil Gotanda has rigorously 
critiqued. 162 Further, racial realists base their arguments on three assumptions 
about racial equality in the United States. First, racial realists claim that 
"racism is a thing of the past." They vilify liberals as deniers of this truism 
who attempt to paint a false picture of America and white Americans as 
"irredeemably racist.,,163 To racial realists, affirmative action policies 
exemplify this liberal agenda of denial and the liberal "fixation on color."I64 
Second, racial realists claim that material inequalities, taking the form of 
racial disparities in, for example, employment, housing, political 
representation, and income, cannot be explained by white racism, 
159. See, e.g., Freeman, supra note 39 (asserting that constitutional antidiscrimination jurisprudence 
legitimizes racial discrimination because it developed from a perpetrator, as opposed to victim, perspective); 
Lawrence, supra note 39 (critiquing the Washington v. Davis decision and its intentionality requirement 
for constitutional equal protection claims). 
160. Harris, supra note 39, at 2003. 
161. MICHAELK. BROWNET AL., WHITE-WASHING RACE: THE MYTH OFA COLOR-BLIND SOCIETY 
5-9, passim (2003). 
162. See supra Part I.B.2. 
163. BROWN ET AL., supra note 161, at 6. 
164. [d. (quoting JIM SLEEPER, LiBERAL RACISM 9, 77-78 (Penguin Books 1997». 
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notwithstanding the existence of small numbers of white supremacists who 
occupy the ideological extreme. Rather, these racial inequalities are explained 
by black moral and cultural pathology and failure. 16s Finally, racial realists 
argue that to the extent racial inequality still exists, it is due not to entrenched 
institutional and cultural white supremacy, but to the failures of civil rights 
leaders who care little about their constituents and only about their own 
power, which they amass by racially "balkanizing" political, social, and 
educational life. 166 
Although one could critique at some length-and many havel67-the 
racial realists' assertions, one of racial realism's deepest flaws, both 
analytically and methodologically speaking, is found in its decontextualized 
and stunningly unsophisticated framing-or, more accurately, erasing-ofthe 
ongoing racial "problem." Although racial realists demonstrate knowledge of 
the histories of American civil rights movements, they process that knowledge 
in an overly linear and discrete fashion: movements happen, laws are passed, 
and "problems" like racism are solved. But racial realists fail to understand 
how "the past has shaped the future"168 and do not acknowledge the 
undeniable and inextricable links between existing material inequalities and 
entrenched ideological legacies. They are oblivious to the existence of 
Young's "five faces of oppression,"169 let alone to how those faces work 
together to reproduce the conditions of inequality. 
Moreover, because of its ideological commitment to the neo-liberal 
conception of individualism and, thus, formal equality, racial realism 
attributes existing racial inequalities to the moral and cultural weaknesses of 
particular communities of color on the one hand, and the moral and cultural 
strengths of the majority community-and problematically of other "model 
minority" communities17°--on the other. These explanations, however, 
165. [d. at 6-7. 
166. [d. at 7; D1NESH D'SOUZA, THE END OF RACISM: PRINCIPLES FOR A MULTIRACIAL SOCIETY ch. 
6 (1995) (citing STEPHEN THERNSTROM & ABIGAIL THERNSTROM, AMERICA IN BLACK AND WHITE: ONE 
NATION, INDIVISmLE 299-300 (1997)). 
167. In fact, several scholars from various fields-including political science, sociology, law, 
education, and criminology-recently co-authored an excellent book that specifically responds to and 
deconstructs-substantivelyand methodologically-the claims of the racial realists. See BROWN ET AL., 
supra note 161. 
168. [d. at 21. 
169. See supra Part I.A. 
170. In this regard, Claire Jean Kim has written on the "racial triangulation" of Asian Americans, in 
an attempt to move race discourse beyond the black-white paradigm. Kim writes: 
Racial triangulation occurs by means of two types of simultaneous, linked processes: (I) processes 
of "relative valorization," whereby dominant group A (whites) valorizes subordinate group B (Asian 
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closely resemble more blatant articulations of the innate superiority of the 
white race over all others and echo Justice Harlan's famous dissent in Plessy 
v. Ferguson where, although holding fast against the separate-but-equal 
doctrine and stating that "[olur Constitution is colorblind," he also opined 
that: 
[t]he white race deems itself to be the dominant race in this country. And so it is, in 
prestige, in achievements, in education, in wealth and in power. So, I doubt not, it will 
continue to be for all time, if it remains true to its great heritage and holds fast to the 
principles of constitutional liberty. 171 
While Justice Harlan is lauded more often than not in constitutional law 
classes as a great champion of racial equality, a careful reading of his dissent 
reveals a challenge to black- and brown-skinned peoples to rise to the level of 
the white race, a challenge that is brimming with Harlan's confidence in their 
inherent inability to do so. It appears, in this post-civil rights era, that racial 
realists are determined to prove Justice Harlan right. 
This Article uses critical race realism to respond to those efforts through 
its proposal of the good faith discrimination claim. Critical race realism has, 
primarily, three analytical goals. First, it aims to address in its analytical 
scope, each of Young' s five faces of oppression, individually and collectively. 
Second, it shifts the focus of discrimination analysis away from the intent of 
the perpetrator, and brings to the center of this analysis the material and 
ideological conditions of the "victim class." 172 Finally, as part of its analytical 
methodology, critical race realism seeks to deconstruct explicitly the 
public/private distinction where that distinction masks and enables conditions 
of subordination. 
Americans) relative to subordinate group C (blacks) on cultural and racial grounds in order to 
dominate both groups, but especially the latter, and (2) processes of "civic ostracism," whereby 
dominant group A (whites) constructs subordinate group B (Asian Americans) as immutably foreign 
and unassimilable with whites on cultural and racial grounds in order to ostracize them from the 
body politic and civic membership .... 
Claire Jean Kim, The Racial Triangulation of Asian Americans, in AsIAN AMERICANS AND POLITICS: 
PERSPECTIVES, EXPERIENCES, PROSPECTS 39, 41 (Gordon H. Chang ed., 2001). See also Sumi K. Cho, 
Converging Stereotypes in Racialized Sexual Harassment: Where the Model Minority Meets Suzie Wong, 
I J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 177, 185-90 (l997)(discussing how "[tlhe model minority myth was developed 
in the mid-I 960s to provide a counter example to politically active African Americans"); Natsu Taylor 
Saito, Alien and Non-Alien Alike: Citizenship. "Foreignness." and Racial Hierarchy in American Law, 
76 OR. L. REv. 261 (1997) (discussing and analyzing the legal "racing" of Asian Americans as both model 
minorities and permanently foreign). 
171. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
172. Freeman, supra note 39, at 1053. 
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N. A GOOD FAITH CLAIM FOR DISCRIMINATION (RE-THEORIZED) 
A. The Good Faith Discrimination Claim 
This Article's proposed common law claim for discrimination is 
doctrinally rooted not in civil rights law, but in contractual good faith law. I 
have already laid the theoretical groundwork for this doctrinal shift in Parts 
I and IT of this Article and in Critical Interventions, but more practically 
speaking, what is to be gained by employing a common law discrimination 
claim rooted in good faith over a traditional civil rights claim? First, on a 
concrete doctrinal.level, the fashioning of the elements of such a claim would 
eliminate the almost insurmountable procedural hurdles imposed by the 
McDonnell-Douglas burden-shifting framework, and which has enshrined in 
civil rights doctrine the perpetrator perspective and intentionality. 173 
Second, the availability of such a claim would have profound expressive 
and educative value. In transferring the lessons of critical race and feminist 
legal theory to plaintiffs, defendants, their lawyers, judges, and jurors through 
the elements of the claim, the law might not only alter the rhetoric of 
discrimination and colorblindness that now dominates civil rights law; it might 
also impact popular cultural understanding of how racial subordination exists 
and persists as a historical and socially contextualized phenomenon. On a 
more general level, making available such a non-statutory, non-civil rights 
claim would express a radically different and more profound commitment to 
racial (and gender and sex) equality (as defined supra), for fashioning the 
claim as a breach of good faith claim would place the equality principle, 
which currently plays a lesser role in contract law, for example in the 
doctrines of unconscionability, undue influence, duress, incapacity, and 
misrepresentation, on the same level, for example, as the principle of free and 
individual will in contracting, a value prioritized in both classical and modem 
contract law. 174 Thus, the good faith discrimination claim would allow two 
173. See supra Parts m.A and I.B.!. 
174. Classical contract law prioritizes individual free will and freedom of contract. In order to protect 
and develop that value, it developed myriad and rigid rules and sub-doctrines-such as the duty to 
read-which obviously favored at the very least, literate parties who could read (sophisticated parties) over 
those who could not read (unsophisticated parties). See, e.g., Ray v. William G. Eurice & Bros., 93 A.2d 
272, 278 (Md. 1952) (holding in part that, absent fraud or duress, "one having the capacity to understand 
a written document who reads and signs it, or, without reading it or having it read to him, signs it, is bound 
by his signature in law"). Significantly, one of the leading contracts casebooks uses the Eurice & Bros. 
case to represent the classical, "objective" theory of intent in contract law. See CHARLES L. KNAPP ET AL., 
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purportedly competing values, freedom to contract (or not to contract) and 
equality, to co-exist. 175 
Some might believe that this Article's attempt to incorporate equality 
principles into areas such as contract law is deeply misguided. However, in 
addition to the Congressional enactment of section 1981, analogies in contract 
law exist to support the creation of a good faith discrimination claim that 
protects parties who are subject to discrimination in contracting. For example, 
the VCC in some part and consumer protection statutes in whole part 
developed to respond to what was viewed as the common law's preference for 
sellers over buyers, where buyers are presumed to be the "weaker" party in 
many commercial transactions and practically all consumer transactions. 
Surely, if we have been, and are so, willing to provide protection in the 
contractual context to presumptively disfavored categories of parties such as 
buyers and/or consumers, we should be able to do so with respect to categories 
of parties who have been disfavored in the contractual context because of their 
race,gender,and/orsex. 
Moreover, as discussed supra, this Article posits that although legal 
categorical distinctions are important in many respects, to the extent the 
blurring of that distinction may serve to effect racial, gender, and/or sex 
equality, theoretical and doctrinal interventions that deconstruct the public-
private distinction must occur. For purposes of this Article, the next questions 
are practical ones: Should the common law claim for discrimination manifest 
as a claim for contractual or tortious breach of good faith? And, in order to 
address the more theoretical issues raised in this Article, what should the 
elements of the claim look like? 
PROBLEMS IN CONTRACf LAw: CASES AND MATERIALS 27-36 (5th ed. 2003). A more contemporary 
example is the scholarly and juridical protection of efficient breach, which occurs when: 
in some cases a party ... break[s] his contract simply because his profit from breach would exceed 
his profit from completion of the contract. If it would also exceed the expected profit to the other 
party from completion of the contract, and if damages are limited to the loss of that profit, there will 
be an incentive to commit a breach. But there should be; it is an efficient breach. 
RICHARD A. POSNER, EcONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw 120 (6th ed. 2003). 
175. Further, the claim could also address an important observation made by critical scholars, that 
American constitutional jurisprudence tends to prioritize certain individualist rights and values, such as the 
right to free speech, over, for example, racial eqUality. See, e.g., Charles R. Lawrence ill, If He Hollers Let 
Him Go: Regulating Racist Speech on Campus, 1990 DUKE L.J. 431, 467 (arguing that equality should 
be a precondition of free speech and where free speech rights and equality clash, more weight should be 
placed on ''that side of the balance aimed at the removal of the badges and incidents of slavery that continue 
to flourish in our CUlture"). 
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1. Contractual or Tortious Breach o/Good Faith-A Brie/Comment on 
Remedies 
Whether the good faith discrimination claim should take the form of a 
breach of contract or tort claim in part depends on the theory of the desired 
remedy, that is, whether the remedy should be compensatory and forward-
looking as a matter of contract, or punitive as a matter of tort. As a remedial 
matter, this Article argues that the proposed claim should be contractual in 
nature. 176 First, the new claim should be contractual because the tort claim for 
discrimination already exists in the form of the civil rights claim. The civil 
rights claim may be considered a species of tort in that it seeks a punitive 
remedy for victims of discrimination, as defined by the current 
antidiscrimination discourse, based on harms incurred due to the breaching of 
a publicly circulating moral code and/or ethical standard against identity-
based forms of discrimination. Second, theorizing the good faith 
discrimination claim as contractual rather than tortious in nature is most 
consistent with an overarching goal of this Article, to reframe and reinterpret 
the current and dominant economically-driven values of contract 
jurisprudence,177 whose purported neutrality has been critiqued at length in the 
scholarship. 178 
Third, and most importantly, this Article cautions against the 
development of the tortious good faith discrimination claim because the 
availability of punitive damages for both torts and civil rights 
violations-which plays a role in framing how we have up to now thought 
about what constitutes illegal discrimination-will enable courts to more 
easily import the existing civil rights fixation on perpetrator perspective and 
intentionality, discussed supra, into the common law cause of action. This 
Article prefers a remedy that aims not to punish the evil wrongdoer, but rather 
176. A fuller discussion of the theories of contract and tort remedy, while enormously important, is 
beyond the scope of this Article, particularly as I believe contract remedies should also be re-theorized. I 
leave that discussion to another paper. 
177. See Critical Interventions, supra note 2, at 1038-49 (arguing that despite the contrasting 
goals-efficiency and faimessljustice-of the two dominant models of good faith, both work to effect 
efficiency). 
178. See, e.g., Dalton, supra note 3 and text accompanying notes 124, 126-32; Jay M. Feinman, 
Critical Approaches to Contract Law, 30 UCLA L. REv. 829, 830 (1983) (exploring the role of contract 
law as "a market facilitator and as a legitimation device" in law more generally); Kennedy, supra note 117; 
Patricia A. Tidwell & Peter Linzer, The Flesh-Colored Band Aid-Contracts, Feminism, Dialogue, and 
Norms, 28 Haus. L. REV. 791 (1991) (examining effect of different cultural norms, including feminist 
norms, on concepts of objectivity and neutrality in contract law). 
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to compensate the non-breaching party for the extra work imposed upon her 
as a result, for example, of her employer's racially-rooted, and, consequently, 
unreasonable expectations under the employment contract. 179 
2. The Elements of the Ciaim l80 
It would be helpful, at this point, to define or set forth briefly, the modern 
definition of contractual good faith. Unfortunately, because good faith 
jurisprudence remains in a somewhat unsettled state,181 the task is a somewhat 
difficult one. Very generally speaking, the implied obligation of good faith 
requires that neither of the contracting parties perform in a such way that 
would deprive her counter-party of her reasonable expectations under the 
contract. 182 The good faith discrimination claim proposed in this Article 
179. Many courts acknowledge the general rule that at-will employment is terminable upon notice 
for any or no reason, but recognize exceptions to that rule, including an implied obligation of good faith 
and fair dealing exception. See, e.g., Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Mem'l Hosp., 710 P.2d 1025, 1030-33, 
1036-40 (Ariz. 1985), superceded by ARIZ. REv. STAT. § 23-1501 (2002); E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. 
v. Pressman, 679 A.2d 436, 437-38 (Del. 1996). But see, e.g., Dandridge v. Chromcraft Corp., 914 F. 
Supp. 1396, 1406-07 (N.D. Miss. 1996) (noting that Mississippi law does not recognize an implied 
obligation of good faith and fair dealing in at-will employment agreements); Rios v. Tex. Commerce 
Bancshares, Inc., 930 S.W.2d 809, 816 (Tex. App. 1996) (noting that "neither the [Texas) legislature nor 
the supreme court [of Texas) has recognized an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in 
employment relationships"). 
180. This subpart excludes a discussion of the element of damages, in part because damages have 
been briefly addressed supra at Part IV.A.I., and in part because the topic deserves a much more in-depth 
analysis than what this Article comprehends. Thus, a deeper examination of the issues raised by the 
damages element of this Article's proposed good faith claim is beyond the scope of this piece, but will be 
taken up in another. 
181. See Houh, supra note 1. 
182. See id. for an extensive discussion of good faith. Briefly, in that article, I address both the 
positive and normative questions of what good faith does and should require. At both a theoretical and 
doctrinal level, and through case analysis, that Article argues that modem courts in applying the two 
dominant models of good faith (sometimes simultaneously) have transformed good faith into an analytical 
framework for the evaluation of underlying breach of contract claims; that is, good faith has become 
detached from its equitable roots, functioning merely as a rhetorical proxy for breach of contract analyses. 
While such a transformation is not entirely a bad thing, in that it provides useful ways in which to think 
about the doctrine of material breach, that Article further argues that courts and commentators should not 
allow good faith to continue to be subsumed completely into the doctrines of material breach and 
constructive conditions. I also argue in that Article that the good faith doctrine is salvageable and that it 
should be resuscitated in a form closer to its equitable original. In this regard, I assert that the doctrine be 
given new life in two different ways: first, vis-a-vis its applicability to bad faith conduct in contract 
formation and negotiation, certainly not a new idea but one worth serious reconsideration; and, second, with 
respect to performance and termination, vis-a-vis its applicability in the context of discrimination based 
on race, gender, sexuality, and other categories of group identity, which is the subject of this Article. 
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focuses on what constitutes "reasonable expectations" with respect to racial 
or gender subordination in the workplace. 183 
a. What Can Employees Reasonably Expect ?-Critical Race and 
Feminist Underpinnings 
In an attempt to move the "outsider,,184 to the center of the good faith 
discrimination claim, its proposed elements are framed around the assumption 
that employees may reasonably expect not to be bound to perform in a certain 
way based on pre-existing racial and/or gender stereotypes, that is, employees 
may reasonably expect not to have to perform to a set of scripted identities in 
the workplace. In other words, any "scripted" expectation that an employer 
has of a particular employee related to his race (and/or gender) would be 
deemed unreasonable. This underlying premise incorporates important critical 
race and feminist insights. First, it rejects colorblindness and addresses 
"cultural imperialism" by legally acknowledging the existence of outsider 
stereotypes that are "attached in some way to their bodies, and which, thus, 
cannot be easily denied.,,185 This underlying principle also recognizes that, 
left to fester, such scripted and pre-existing stereotypes that pervade the 
workplace and society at large-whether negative or positivel86--can 
negatively impact an outsider's work performance in concrete ways. 
Second, framing reasonable expectations in this way for purposes of this 
claim shifts factual proof questions away from those relating to the alleged 
perpetrator's intent to discriminate, to those relating to how the existence of 
race and gender stereotypes manifest and burden those to whom such 
stereotypes attach. In more theoretical terms, the factual inquiries required of 
the good faith discrimination claim would enable a plaintiff to demonstrate the 
material manifestations of being designated as Other. 187 
183. See supra Part LB.4. Of course, reasonable expectations in the context of good faith refers to 
many other kinds of expectations. For example, one can reasonably expect from her counter-party in 
contracting: full disclosure of material facts about the subject matter of the contract; substantial 
performance without known material deviation from contractual specifications; refraining from abuse of 
contractually reserved discretion; mitigating damages in event of breach; and fair and reasonable 
interpretation of contract provisions. Robert S. Summers, "Good Faith" in General Contract Law and the 
Sales Provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code, 54 VA. L. REv. 195,203 (1968). 
184. See supra Part LA. 
185. See id.; YOUNG, supra note II, at 59. 
186. An example of a potentially harmful positive stereotype is that of the Asian Pacific American 
"model minority." See supra note 170. 
187. See supra Part LA.; YOUNG, supra note II, at 49-63. 
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b. Proving the Stereotype 
The first element of the proposed good faith discrimination claim requires 
a plaintiff to demonstrate the existence of factually-relevant racial and/or 
gender stereotype(s) in society generally and more specifically in the plaintiff-
employee's former workplace, as well as the corresponding absence of a white 
male "image repertoire."188 Proving this element would not be as onerous as 
it sounds. With respect to the general pervasiveness of stereotypes relating in 
particular to minority groups and/or women, research and scholarship on the 
causes and effects of stereotyping in the workplace and on productivity 
abound in the social sciences-particularly in management science and 
behavioral and cognitive psychology-as well as in areas dealing with more 
theoretical representational issues such as cultural studies. 189 While proving 
that the existence of those stereotypes will be onerous to the first generation 
188. The term "image repertoire" is borrowed from feminist film theorist and post-colonialist Trinh 
Minh-ha, who, in the specific context of Third World post-colonialism, uses it to refer to a finite set of 
representations that a dominant entity creates to Orientalize and dominate a subjugated entity as Other. 
Trinh writes: 
This is the way the West carries the burden of the Other. Naming is part of the human rituals of 
incorporation, and the unnamed remains less human than the inhuman or sub-human. The 
threatening Otherness must, therefore, be transformed into figures that belong to a definite image-
repertoire .... The perception of the outsider as the one who needs help has taken on the successive 
forms of the barbarian, the pagan, the infidel, the wild man, the "native," and the underdeveloped. 
TRINH T. MINH-HA, WOMAN NATIVE OTHER: WRITING POSTCOLONIALITY AND FEMINISM 54 (1989). See 
also SAID, supra note 28 (defining Orientalism). 
189. For examples of such scholarship in the management sciences, see Bengt Holmstrom & Paul 
Milgrom, The Firm as an Incentive System, 84 AM. EcON. REv. 972 (1994) (exploring how different levels 
of workplace incentives impact a worker'S conduct); Herminia Ibarra, Making Panner: A Mentor's Guide 
to the Psychological Journey, 78 HARv. Bus. REv. 147 (2000) (discussing conflict between employee's 
true sense of self and workplace culture at professional firms); Kevin Lang, A Language Theory of 
Discrimination, 101 Q.J. EcON. 363 (1986) (exploring whether outsiders who assimilate their conduct to 
that of dominant group fare better in the workplace). For examples in the areas of behavioral, cognitive, 
and social psychology, see Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias 
Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opponunity, 4 7 STAN. L. REv. 1161 (1995) (arguing 
that many biased employment decisions result not from discriminatory intent or motivation, as current 
jurisprudence presumes, but from a variety of unintentional categorization-related judgment errors 
characterizing normal human cognitive functioning); Michael Selmi, Family Leave and the Gender Wage 
Gap, 78 N.C. L. REv. 707, 752 n.162 (2000) (citing studies that suggest that employers are likely to read 
ambiguous evidence as confirming prior preconceptions); Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment 
Discrimination: A Structural Approach, 101 COLUM. L. REv. 458 (2001) (arguing that because "second 
generation" forms of bias result from patterns of interaction, informal norms, networking, mentoring, and 
evaluation, a more structural approach to regulating employment relationships is necessary to address more 
common forms of discrimination). For examples in cultural studies, see JUDITH BUTLER, BODIES THAT 
MATTER 136-39 (1993) (arguing that all people engage in a series of performances); Hall, supra note 123. 
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of lawyers bringing the good faith discrimination claim, the benefits of this 
work would far outweigh its initial costs, as future generations of lawyers 
could rely on evidence introduced in successful "test" cases, needing only to 
update that evidence and research as necessary. Second, bringing such 
evidence to the attention of judges, defense lawyers, and juries would have 
great educational benefits that also might impact our more general 
sociocultural understandings of discrimination and racial and gender 
scripting. 190 Third, in response to legitimate concerns over the overly 
theoretical direction of scholarly work on race and gender equality issues (and 
at the risk of sounding like a self-interested academic), the employment of 
such evidence would bring the work of practitioners and critical scholars 
closer together in their service to the common goal of a just and equal 
society. 191 
As to proving the existence of general relevant stereotypes in the more 
specific context of the plaintiff's former or current workplace, this Article 
suggests that myriad different kinds of evidence should be relevant and 
admissible to prove this element, since the employer's intent to discriminate 
is not at issue in the good faith discrimination claim. Examples of admissible 
and relevant evidence might include related workplace demographics, the sort 
190. The litigation history of Grutterv. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003), provides important precedent 
with respect to what kind of proof can (and, in some cases, should) be presented in cases involving 
discrimination. In the Grutter case, the University of Michigan Law School and the student intervenors 
presented evidence and testimony at trial of "a team of leading scholars [who served] as its experts in these 
cases to establish the basis for the University's argument that there is a compelling need for diversity in 
higher education." Expert Report: The Compelling Needfor Diversity in Higher Education, 5 MICH. J. 
RACE & L. 241 (1999) (publishing expert reports presented by the University of Michigan at trial in defense 
of its admissions policy; expert report authors ineluded: Thomas Sugrue, Eric Foner, Albert Camarillo, 
Patricia Gurin, William Bowen, Claude Steele, Kent Syverud, and Robert B. Webster). Additionally, 
Professor Ian Ayres has collected an enormous amount of data that is quite persuasive in proving the 
continued existence of race and gender discrimination, which will continue to have a significant impact on 
future discrimination-related litigation. IAN AYRES, PERV ASIVEPREruDICE? UNCONVENTIONAL EVIDENCE 
OF RACE AND GENDER DISCRIMINA nON (200 I); see also the website of The National Consumer Law Center 
for updates, available at http://www.nelc.org! (last visited Nov. 29, 2004) (providing updates on litigation 
stemming from the sort of empirical evidence gathered by Ayres and others). 
191. Over a decade ago, the Honorable Harry T. Edwards, of the Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia, famously expressed his concerns over "the growing disjunction between legal education and the 
legal profession." Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the Legal 
Profession, 91 MICH. L. REv. 34 (1992). Judge Edwards criticized in particular what he then-viewed as 
the increasingly theoretical nature of legal scholarship in the fields, for example, oflaw and economics, law 
and literature, critical legal studies, critical race theory, and feminist legal theory. Id. at 34-35. He further 
questioned this scholarship's usefulness to practicing lawyers and to judges, and cautioned that the 
unmediated and continued emphasis on such theoretical scholarship in (elite) law schools would result in 
the desertion of a primary responsibility of law schools: to produce and train lawyers. Id. at 35. 
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of which might ordinarily be presented in a Title vn disparate impact 
claim,192 as well as anecdotal evidence. Significantly, because such anecdotal 
evidence would be presented not to show a hostile and pervasive work 
environment, as in the typical harassment case, but to demonstrate the 
existence of particular stereotypes in the workplace, evidence demonstrating 
the permissive use of racial or sexual epithets would create a strong 
presumption of performance-related scripting and stereotyping, since it would 
impose on the employee the unreasonable expectation to withstand such 
explicit and blatant manifestations of disrespect as part of her job. 
In its defense against the establishment by the plaintiff of this element of 
the prima facie claim, a defendant-employer could introduce contradictory 
social science research on societal stereotyping. However, an employer most 
likely would concentrate its efforts on proving that the relevant stereotype did 
not exist or function discursively within its own workplace. Thus, for 
example, the employer could attempt to show that its workplace was 
meaningfully integrated, and that a "critical mass"-in the Grutter sense of 
that term193--of women and/or people of color were employed there across 
departments. Or, the employer could demonstrate its attempts to combat these 
kinds of stereotypes through existing policies and/or programs. 
c. Counter-Performing, Failing To Perform, and Over-Performing 
Identity 
Having alleged the existence of particular social stereotypes in the 
workplace, the plaintiff must next show how her "working identity" impacted 
192. See Chamallas. supra note 58. 
193. See Brief for Respondent at 40-43, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 u.s. 306 (2003) (No. 02-241) 
(discussing why the University of Michigan Law School does not employ a "quota" in admitting a "critical 
mass" of minority students). In agreeing with the Law School, the Grutter Court stated: 
The Law School does not premise its need for critical mass on "any belief that minority students 
always (or even consistently) express some characteristic minority viewpoint on any issue." 
[citation omitted]. To the contrary, diminishing the force of such stereotypes is both a crucial part 
of the Law School's mission, and one that it cannot accomplish with only token numbers of 
minority students. Just as growing up in a particular region or having particular professional 
experiences is likely to affect an individual's views, so too is one's own, unique experience of being 
a racial minority in a society, like our own, in which race unfortunately still matters .... 
. . . [T]he Law School engages in a highly individualized, holistic review of each applicant's file, 
giving serious consideration to all the ways an applicant might contribute to a diverse educational 
environment. The Law School affords this individualized consideration to applicants of all races. 
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 333, 337. 
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her work performance. The specifics of her allegations would of course 
depend on the nature of the stereotype allegedly attached to her by her 
employer. Did she feel compelled to counter-perform her working identity 
because of negative (or positive) stereotypes that attached to her by, for 
example, speaking out against the imposed stereotypes or performing against 
script? If so, what kinds of risks did she incur in counter-performing? On the 
other hand, did she feel that she had to perform to a certain "positive" 
stereotype for fear that her failure to do so would result in negative action 
against her? If so, what kinds of conduct did she engage in and/or risks did 
she incur in response to that pressure? Because this element is so dependent 
upon the kinds of stereotypes attaching to the plaintiff, it will be discussed 
further in the context of the case analyses, infra. 
d. Adverse Employment Action and Its Impact 
In order to establish her prima facie good faith discrimination claim, a 
plaintiff would next have to allege that her employer took some negative or 
adverse employment action against her. Although the statutory civil rights 
claim also requires a showing of adverse employment action, this element for 
purposes of the proposed claim would employ a much broader definition of 
"adverse employment action" than Title VII jurisprudence does. 
Under Title VII, "adverse employment action" is defined as a "materially 
adverse change in the terms, privileges, duration and conditions of 
employment," which includes '''discharge, refusal to hire, refusal to promote, 
demotion, reduction in pay, and reprimand,"'194 as well as dissemination of 
negative employment references and issuing underserved negative 
performance reviews. 195 Courts have further clarified that under Title VII, 
"not everything that makes an employee unhappy is an actionable adverse 
action,,196 and that a materially adverse action means more than "a mere 
inconvenience or an alteration of job responsibilities." 197 Thus, for example, 
194. Treglia v. Town of Manlius, 313 F.3d 713, 720 (2d Cir. 2002) (quoting Morris v. Lindau, 196 
F.3d 102, 11 0 (2d Cir. 1999». 
195. Brooks v. City of San Mateo, 229 F.3d 917, 928 (9th CiT. 2000). See also Burlington Indus., 
Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 761 (1998) (defining adverse employment action as a "tangible employment 
action [that] constitutes a significant change in employment status, such as hiring, firing, failing to promote, 
reassignment with significantly different responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant change in 
benefits"). 
196. Cullom v. Brown, 209 F.3d 1035, 1041 (7th Cir. 2000) (quoting Smart v. Ball State Univ., 89 
F.3d 437, 441 (7th Cir. 1996». 
197. [d. (quoting Ribando v. United Airlines, Inc., 200 F.3d 507, 510 (7th Cir. 1999». 
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under Title VII, the suspension of a railroad employee without pay, followed 
thirty-seven days later by a reinstatement with back pay, constitutes adverse 
employment action/98 but taking certain action as to a female employee 
following her complaints of gender discrimination, including changing her 
duties, requiring her to report to different supervisor, not providing her with 
necessary training, tools, or software, and placing negative job memoranda 
placed in her personnel file, does not. 199 Adverse action under the good faith 
claim would include the action taken against the female employee just 
described. 
Moreover, while some courts have held that actions taken against 
plaintiffs by their employers that did not impact their formal status and salary 
cannot constitute adverse employment action under Title VII, the good faith 
claim would designate some forms of such conduct as negative action based 
on all of the factual allegations, including those relating to the remaining 
elements of the claim. For example, the transferring of an employee to a 
different location which lengthened her commute, giving her particularly 
198. Whitev. BurlingtonN. & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 364F.3d 789,802 (6th Cir. 2004). See also Treglia 
v. Town of Manlius, 313 F.3d at 720 (finding that employer failing to promote employee who receive<! 
highest score on examination for position and responding to employee's inquiry that although he had done 
a good job he would not receive a promotion "now or ever" and that employee should "get out of the 
business" was considered unlawful under definition of "adverse action"); Hashimoto v. Dalton, 118 F.3d 
671, 674 (1 st Cir. 1997) (finding that dissemination of adverse employment references can constitute 
adverse employment action if motivated by discriminatory intent); Florence v. Runyon, 990 F. Supp. 485, 
496-98 (N .D. Tex. 1997) (finding that transfer of postal employee to less-desirable work hours and location 
but no change in pay, job title, or benefits following an employee's filing of discrimination charge could 
constitute retaliatory adverse employment action). 
199. Cantrell v. Jay R. Smith Mfg. Co., 248 F. Supp. 2d 1126,1137 (M.D. Ala. 2003) (finding that 
actions taken against female employee following her complaints of gender discrimination, including having 
her duties changed, being required to report to different supervisor, not being provided necessary training, 
tools, or software, and having negative job memoranda placed in her personnel file, did not constitute 
materially adverse employment actions, because they did not seriously and materially change terms, 
conditions, or privileges of work). See also Griffin v. Potter, 356 F.3d 824 (7th Cir. 2004) (transferring 
employee to different location which lengthened her commute combined with assigning her particularly 
difficult work assignments and refusing to approve her annual leave because of work backlog, does not 
constitute adverse employment action); Tran v. Trs. of State Colis. in Colo., 355 F.3d 1263, 1268-69 (lOth 
Cir. 2004) (transferring of female corrections officer from male to female correction facility which did not 
impact duties, pay, title, or responsibilities did not constitute adverse employment action); Brooks v. City 
of San Mateo, 229 F.3d 917, 929 (9th Cir. 2000) (finding that allegedly retaliatory ostracism suffered at 
hands of a co-worker cannot constitute adverse employment action because employer's forcing employees 
to associate with each other might be unconstitutional); Cossette v. Minn. Power & Light, 188 F.3d 964, 
972 (8th Cir. 1999) (finding that unfavorable performance evaluation received six weeks following 
employee's filing charge with EEOC is not adverse action); Daniels v. BASFCorp., 270 F. Supp. 2d 847, 
857 (S.D. Tex. 2003) (finding that negative employment action, even if inaccurate, is not adverse 
employment action under Title VII). 
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difficult work assignments, including work arguably outside of her job 
description, and failure to approve her annual leave request because of work 
backlog resulting from the foregoing, might very well qualify as adverse 
action for purposes of the good faith claim. This would particularly be the 
case if the remaining elemental allegations, taken as a whole, would suggest 
that such negative action resulted in the reification of certain stereotypes or 
was taken because of those stereotypes (see infra regarding causation).200 
The most important difference between Title vn standards of adverse 
action and the proposed good faith claim's standards is that while Title vn 
standards require, quite literally, a "materially" adverse change, evidenced by 
negative changes in salary, wage, status, and/or other similarly material 
conditions, the good faith claim's standards would allow and sometimes 
require a deeper inquiry into how and why the plaintiff believes that the 
actions taken against her were adverse. In other words, with respect to the 
example just given, the plaintiff asserting the good faith discrimination claim 
could have alleged that her work overload and transfer to a less convenient 
location constituted adverse employment action because, combined, these 
actions made here appear less competent than other employees who had not 
been given such difficult assignments and transferred to further locations. 
Further, if the plaintiff in this case had been, for example, a black woman, she 
could have argued that she was given these onerous assignments because she 
had "out-performed" a raced arid gendered stereotype of general 
incompetence. On the other hand, if in this case many employees in the 
plaintiff s department· had been given extra work and transferred to less 
convenient locations in the employer's comprehensive attempts to improve 
overall efficiency and output, the plaintiff would not have been able to show 
adverse impact resulting from the complained of action, absent other 
compelling facts. 
e. Causation 
Predictably, the element of causation, which links racial and gender 
scripting to adverse action and impact on the plaintiff, is the most difficult 
element to develop, particularly because conventional antidiscrimination 
discourse has taught us that the intent to discriminate is the linchpin of 
causation. How, then, should causation be theorized, given that one explicit 
200. In Griffin, 356 F.3d at 828, the court held that the actions described in this example did not 
constitute adverse employment action under Title VII. 
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goal of this Article's pr~posed good faith discrimination claim is to 
deconstruct the dominant intent analysis? 
In this regard, a lesson might be learned from corporate securities law's 
"fraud on the market" theory, which the Supreme Court adopted in Basic v. 
Levinson,201 a landmark securities fraud case.202 In somewhat over-simplified 
terms, the Court held that where a plaintiff-investor asserting a Rule lOb_5203 
violation could prove that the defendant had issued a materially misleading 
misstatement or misrepresentation about the stock and value of a company, the 
fraud on the market theory, which theorizes how information affects the 
market price of publicly-traded stock,204 could be used as a proxy for the 
reliance and causation elements of the lOb-5 claim.205 In other words, if a 
plaintiff-investor, in asserting his lOb-5 claim, can demonstrate the 
materialiti06 of the alleged misrepresentation, the fraud on the market theory 
creates a presumption that the misrepresentation caused the investor to trade 
201. Basic v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988). 
202. Antidiscrimination law and corporate and securities law may appear to be unlikely bedfellows, 
however, those who write on race and discrimination may have much to leam from corporate and securities 
jurisprudence. See, e.g., Anupam Chander, Minorities, Shareholder and Otherwise, 113 YALE L.I. 119, 
Jl9 (2003) (examining how corporate law and constitutional law have addressed the "problem" of 
minorities, and arguing that "[ c ]orporate law understands what constitutional law does not. Minority status 
matters to law."). 
203. Together, section 1O(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, IS U.S.c. § 78j (2000), and 
Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 24D.lOb-5 (1993), constitute the primary anti-fraud weapon in federal securities 
law. Significantly, Rule IOb-5 not only permits the Securities Exchange Commission to bring enforcement 
actions, but it also provides a private cause of action for securities fraud. See Superintendent of Ins. v. 
Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9 (1976) (upholding lower courts' recognition of implied private 
actions for violations of Rule 10b-S). Briefly, in order to assert a Rule 10b-S claim, a (private) plaintiff 
must show: "(1) fraud or deceit (2) by any person (3) in connection with (4) the purchase or sale (S) of any 
security." THOMAS LEE HAzEN, THE LAw OF SECURITIES REGULATION § 12.4 (4th ed. 2002). See also 
generally DONNA M. NAGY ET AL., SECURITIES LITiGATION AND ENFORCEMENT: CASES AND MATERIALS 
(2003). Moreover, in proving fraud or deceit, a plaintiff must show materiality, reliance, causation, and 
damages. HAzEN, supra § 12.4. 
204. The Basic Court explained the fraud on the market theory accordingly: 
The fraud on the market theory is based on the hypothesis that, in an open and developed securities 
market, the price of a company's stock is determined by the available material information 
regarding the company and its business .... Misleading statements will therefore defraud purchasers 
of stock even if the purchasers do not directly rely on the misstatements .... The causal connection 
between the defendants' fraud and the plaintiffs' purchase of stock in such a case is no less 
significant than in a case of direct reliance on misrepresentations. 
Basic v. Levinson, 485 U.S. at 241-42 (quoting Peil v. Speiser, 806 F.2d 11S4, 1160-61 (3d Cir. 1986». 
20S. Id. at 241-50. 
206. Materiality is itself subject to a "reasonable investor" standard. Id. at 232 (holding that the 
standard set forth in TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.s. 438 (1976), whereby omitted fact is 
material if there is substantial likelihood that its disclosure would have been considered significant by 
reasonable investor, is applicable in section lO(b) and Rule IOb-5 actions). 
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on the stock because the investor presumptively relied on the material 
misrepresentation in so trading.207 Thus, if the defendant in a material 
misrepresentation case wishes to avoid liability, it must show how its 
misstatement did not affect the market price of the stock, since the fraud on 
the market theory allows for the presumption that misrepresentations do affect 
it.208 
While controversial, the fraud on the market theory is now well-
established, and for good reason, especially if one accepts that our markets are 
imperfect. But, for purposes of this Article, one of the most significant 
aspects of the Court's opinion in Basic v. Levinson was its willingness to 
accept highly sophisticated and scholarly (and, as such, somewhat unsettled) 
economic theory in adopting the fraud on the market theory to presume 
reliance. Some have critiqued the Basic Court, claiming that its political 
commitment to strengthening anti-fraud statutes in the area of federal 
securities law was what truly motivated it to adopt the fraud on the market 
theory?09 However, regardless of what one thinks of the Court's political 
motivations in employing fraud on the market theory to create a rebuttable 
presumption of reliance based on materiality, surely it did better to consider 
and explicitly acknowledge the existing theory and scholarship, rather than to 
ignore the extensive research in the area and justify in a more tautological and 
dogmatic fashion the presumption of reliance. 
With respect to the causation element of the good faith discrimination 
claim, I am suggesting that we do in some sense as the Basic Court did. Given 
the abundance of scholarship and research relating to race and gender 
stereotyping in many interdisciplinary fields,21O we can and should presume, 
where certain racial and gender stereotypes have attached and presented 
themselves in the workplace and the plaintiff has adjusted her performance 
according to those stereotypes, whether by counter-performing, over-
performing, or under-performing, a correlation between those stereotypes in 
the workplace and the burdensome and unreasonable expectations imposed by 
the employer on the plaintiff as a result of her failure to perform and/or her 
207. [d. at 241-49. 
208. /d. 
209. In fact, Justice White scathingly criticized the majority's employment of the fraud on the market 
theory in the Basic case. /d. at 250,254 (White, J., dissenting) ("[W]hile the economists' theories which 
underpin the fraud-on-the-market presumption may have the appeal of mathematical exactitude and 
scientific certainty, they are-in the end-nothing more than theories which mayor may not prove accurate 
upon further consideration. Even the most earnest advocates of economic analysis of the law recognize 
this.") (citation omitted). 
210. See supra note 188. 
HeinOnline -- 66 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 505 2004-2005
2005] CRITICAL RACE REALISM 505 
counter-performance of her working identity. Thus, the presumption that the 
plaintiff s counter-performance of her scripted working identity caused the 
alleged adverse employment action arises when the adverse action follows the 
counter-performance. The court may then find that there has been breach of 
good faith in that the employer has deprived the employee of her reasonable 
expectation of not having to perform to a stereotype; and, on the flipside, in 
that the employer has imposed unreasonable expectations on the plaintiff by 
requiring her to perform according to a scripted identity. 
It is certainly possible that an employer might have taken adverse action 
against an employee simply because she was a bad employee, relatively or 
generally speaking. In the rhetoric of conventional antidiscrimination law, an 
employer might have taken action against an employee for a "legitimate 
business purpose." Under the good faith discrimination claim, the defendant 
could still defend itself in this way. But, the defendant would have to assert 
and prove its "legitimate business purpose" as an affirmative defense, rather 
than as part of a burden-shifting framework such as that one imposed by 
M cDonnell-Douglas. Requiring the defendant to prove its legitimate business 
purpose as an affirmative defense would also eliminate the pretext analysis, 
which elimination is consistent with the dual goal of de-emphasizing and 
deconstructing discriminatory intent as the keystone of legally cognizable 
discrimination and making relevant the plaintiff s perspective on the 
circumstances of the alleged adverse action.211 
B. Critiques of Section 1981 Cases and Applications of the Good Faith 
Claim 
The absence of protections provided by federal and civil rights statutes 
against the type of performati ve identity discrimination at issue in this Article 
is exemplified in the case law. This subpart looks at four illustrative cases in 
which each of the plaintiffs brought-and lost-section 1981 claims, along 
with various other claims, for employment discrimination against their former 
employers. This subpart argues that each of these plaintiffs, however, did 
suffer some form of discrimination based on distinct forms of identity 
211. Further, an employer could establish its legitimate business purpose defense by demonstrating 
that consistent expectations were imposed on all employees and that those expectations-in the form of the 
employer's various policies-had been communicated to all employees, including the plaintiff; and that the 
plaintiff, having knowledge of those expectations and policies, failed to comply with them. Many might 
argue, rightly so, that this would pose a great threat to at-will employment. However, the protection of at-
will employment is not something about which I am particularly concerned or that I wish to advocate. 
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performance, and that they would have been much more likely to succeed in 
obtaining some relief if the proposed good faith discrimination claim had been 
available to them. 
1. Counter-Performing Identity: Shannon v. Ford Motor Co.212 
In Shannon v. Ford Motor Co., Fragena Shannon ("Shannon"), a black 
woman, sued Ford for its failure to promote her from the non-skilled position 
of "assembler" to the skilled-trades position of supervisor, asserting race and 
sex discrimination under section 1981, Title VII, and Minnesota's state 
antidiscrimination statute.213 Having successfully completed her skilled-trades 
training, Shannon first was placed on a wait-list for supervisory positions and 
then was moved to a wait-list for a skilled-trades apprenticeship position.214 
After suffering an injury that caused a ten-month absence from work, Shannon 
returned to Ford, at which time Ford offered her a skilled-trades electrician 
apprenticeship that would require her to give up her spot on the supervisory 
wait-list. Not wanting to forego an opportunity in the skilled trades, Shannon 
took the electrician apprenticeship and was removed from the supervisory 
wait-list.215 Subsequently, Shannon, one of very few women and/or African 
Americans in the program, suffered both racial and sexual harassment 
throughout her electrician apprenticeship and also alleged that she did not 
receive adequate training because of her race and sex.216 
The district court granted summary judgment to Ford on Shannon's 
section 1981 and Title VII failure to promote claim, and the Eighth Circuit 
Court of Appeals affirmed.217 The court concluded that, assuming Shannon 
had made out a prima facie case,218 her claims would have failed because she 
212. Shannon v. Ford Motor Co., 72 F.3d 678 (8th Cir. 1996). 
213. /d. at 680-81. 
214. [d. 
215. [d. at 681. 
216. For example, on one occasion, one of her co-workers showed her a picture of a toilet and said 
to her, "[Tlhat's you down there with all the other [ ... J." On another, she found a "sexually explicit 
'application for a date'" at her work station, which likewise had been placed there by a co-worker. Upon 
reporting these and other incidents of demeaning treatment to her supervisor, he "only laughed." 
Additionally, when Shannon complained to her supervisor that she was not receiving adequate training in 
the program, he responded, "[YJou are black and a woman, so you have two strikes against you. They don't 
want you [in the programJ anyway." [d. at 681 n.2. 
217. [d. at 685-86. Although Shannon was permitted to try her sexual harassment, sex 
discrimination, discriminatory retaliation, and other race discrimination claims, the jury found for Ford on 
all those claims. [d. at 681 n.4. 
218. As a threshold matter, the court held that Shannon had not made out her prima facie case 
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"produced no evidence that Ford's reason for not promoting her [was] a 
sham."219 The court further noted that: 
[Shannon's] "credibility has some weaknesses" and that Ford's "skepticism regarding 
[Ms. Shannon's] allegations that her poor work performance was caused by co-worker 
harassment and lack of training is supported by .... [Ms. Shannon's] excessive 
absenteeism ... [her] argumentative and emotional behavior ... [her] difficulty 
accepting directions and her attitude that her assignments were menial.'>22O 
Significantly, the court conceded that while bias quite possibly infected Ford's 
apprenticeship program, this bias was not reasonably related to its failure to 
promote her.221 
Under Title vn and section 1981, Shannon's claim failed at two critical 
points. At the outset, the court held that Ford's removal of Shannon from the 
supervisory wait-list did not constitute adverse employment action for 
purposes of the failure to promote claim.222 Second, even if it had, Shannon's 
claim failed-as so many do--at the pretext stage. This case also 
demonstrates how the pretext requirement, under which plaintiff must show 
that the employer's legitimate business purpose is false and a mere cover for 
intentional discrimination, not only precludes most plaintiffs from surviving 
summary judgment (since proving intent to discriminate is notoriously 
difficult), but also adds insult to this injury, for a plaintiffs failure to show 
pretext is used often to "prove" her "weak" credibility (read: pathological 
obsession with race). In part, based on its assessment of Shannon's lack of 
credibility, the court concluded that Shannon's allegations of harassment and 
lack of training in her electrician apprenticeship were immaterial to her failure 
to promote claim, since the former did not cause the latter.223 
The court's rather shallow analysis in this case is both enabled and caused 
by conventional civil rights jurisprudence, which forces plaintiffs to assert one 
or a number of different types of intentional discrimination claims, such as, 
failure to promote, retaliatory discrimination, sexual or racial harassment, and, 
of course, discriminatory termination. Thus, even if the facts, taken together, 
because her removal from the supervisory wait-list in exchange for the electrician apprenticeship did not 
constitute the sort of "rejection" required to assert both her section 1981 and Title vn claims. [d. at 682. 
219. [d. at 683. 
220. [d. at 681 n.3 (quoting St. Paul Department of Human Rights' findings on Shannon's claim). 
221. [d. at 685-86. Specifically, the court held that evidence of racial bias in the apprenticeship 
program did not satisfy the "reasonably related" standard of Title vn's administrative exhaustion 
requirement for discrimination claims. [d. 
222. See id. at 685-86. 
223. See id. at 683. 
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make a strong circumstantial case for racial or gender bias in the workplace, 
as the court acknowledged in Shannon, their parsing and decontextualization 
for purposes of establishing the different sub-species of claims often results 
in the failure of those distinct claims. Thus, plaintiffs' harms go unremedied. 
Had the good faith discrimination claim been available to Shannon, she 
probably would have been able to obtain some measure of remedy, 
particularly because the claim requires a more holistic consideration of the 
facts and does not require plaintiffs to parse their claims and, hence, the facts 
giving rise to them. First, the facts, as reported in the published opinion 
evidence the existence of certain stereotypes of black women at Ford, 
specifically, in the skilled-trades environment.224 Assuming that evidence of 
general stereotypes could be proven through research and scholarship, the 
court noted certain stereotype evidence in footnotes. For example, on one 
occasion, one of Shannon's co-workers showed her a picture of a toilet and 
said to her, "[T]hat's you down there with all the other [ ... ].'>225 On another, 
she found a "sexually explicit 'application for a date'" at her work station, 
which likewise had been placed there by a co-worker.226 Upon reporting these 
and other incidents of demeaning treatment to her supervisor, he "only 
laughed.,,227 Additionally, when Shannon complained to her supervisor that 
she was not receiving adequate training in the program, he responded, "[Y]ou 
are black and a woman, so you have two strikes against you. They don't want 
you [in the program] anyway."228 Thus, Shannon-consistent with existing 
and especially malignant stereotypes of black people and black women-was 
scripted as incompetent ("down there with all the other [shit, or some form of 
excrement, we can assume]"), sexually available, and inferior and unwanted 
as both a woman and a person of color.229 
224. See id. 
225. Id. at 681 n.2. 
226. Id. 
227. Id. 
228. See id. at 681 n.2. 
229. For discussions of stereotypes of black women, see Patricia Hill Collins, Mammies, Matriarchs, 
and Other Controlling Images, in BLACK FEMINIST THOUGHT: KNOWLEDGE, CONSCIOUSNESS, AND THE 
POUTICS OF EMPOWERMENT 69 (2d ed. 2000) (quoting TRUDIER HARRIs, FROM MAMMIES TO MILITANTS 
DOMESTICS IN BLACK AMERICAN LITERATURE 4 (1982) ("Called Matriarch, Emasculator and Hot Momma. 
Sometimes Sister, Pretty Baby, Auntie, Mammy and Girl. Called Unwed Mother, Welfare Recipient and 
Inner City Consumer. The Black American Woman has had to admit that while nobody knew the troubles 
she saw, everybody, his brother and his dog, felt qualified to explain her, even to herself."»; BELL HOOKS, 
AIN'T I A WOMAN: BLACK WOMEN AND FEMINISM 65-86 (1981) (exploring stereotypes of black women 
as "beasts" and "sexual savages," aggressively matriarchal, Amazonian, and incompetent and unconfident). 
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Moreover, the court agreed with both Ford and the St. Paul Department 
of Human Rights ("Department"), which found that Shannon's lack of 
credibility in making her claims about the impact of the harassment and failure 
to train on her work performance was evidenced by her "excessive 
absenteeism ... [her] argumentative and emotional behavior ... [her] 
difficulty accepting directions and her attitude that her assignments were 
menial ... .'>230 Neither the court nor the, Department had considered, 
however, the obvious possibility that Shannon's absenteeism and other 
troubling conduct (to Ford, anyway) were themselves caused by her co-
workers' harassment, her supervisor's condoning of this harassment, and 
Ford's failure to train her adequately. Instead, the court willingly used these 
facts to affirm stereotypes of the black woman worker as lazy ("excessive[ly]" 
absent[ ... ]), aggressive and irrational ("argumentative and emotional"), and 
hostile to authority (in refusing to follow directions and complaining about 
menial work assignments).231 
Thus, Ford expected her to act as the aggressive, hostile, lazy, emotional, 
and incompetent worker, imposing quite unreasonable expectations on her 
under the good faith claim. These expectations were made known to Shannon 
through both her co-workers and her supervisors. The good faith claim would 
next require Shannon to demonstrate how these unreasonable expectations 
impacted her work. Did she have to engage in extra work to counter-perform 
the stereotypes that Ford had attached to her? Or did the extra work manifest 
in Shannon's attempts to defy and defeat the scripted and unreasonable 
expectations imposed upon her, which in tum caused her to incur a certain 
amount of risk in speaking out against her "scripting," and ultimately resulted 
in her termination? The good faith claim would have required further inquiry 
designed to respond to these very important questions. 
Moreover, the court's holding that Shannon's removal from the 
supervisory wait list in exchange for the skilled-trades electrician 
apprenticeship did not constitute adverse employment action is myopic. At 
the very least, the court should have inquired into whether such offers 
followed protocol at the Twin Cities plant, and into the nature of hierarchy at 
the plant. How were supervisors perceived there, as compared with other 
types of skilled-trades workers? What were the differences, both in terms of 
material compensation and "prestige," between the two positions that Shannon 
was forced to choose between? How did race and gender 9ynamics play out 
230. Shannon, 72 F.3d at 681 n.3 (quoting Department's finding on Shannon's administrative claim). 
231. [d.; see Hill Collins, supra note 229; HOOKS, supra note 229. 
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in the skills-trades, more generally? Again, the good faith claim would have 
required some inquiry into these questions, which in turn would bring the 
outsider experience to the center of the claim. 
As to causation, further inquiry into the issues just discussed could very 
well lead to a conclusion that Shannon was offered a skilled-trades 
apprenticeship only if she forewent the opportunity to become a supervisor 
because black women were largely perceived at the Twin Cities plant (and 
more generally) as incompetent and not worthy of respect. Even based on the 
facts as reported, one senses that Shannon was set up for failure in the 
electrician apprenticeship, due in large part to the unreasonable expectations 
imposed upon her and the resulting difficulty she encountered in handling and 
responding to those expectations. She felt she was being scripted by co-
workers and supervisors, she spoke up about it, her work performance likely 
was impacted as a result of it, and she was terminated. The good faith claim 
would have compelled a deeper inquiry into causation. While it might be true 
that Ford terminated Shannon because of poor work performance, what caused 
that poor work performance? While the treatment Shannon received at the 
hands of her co-workers and supervisors did not rise to the level of a "hostile 
environment" necessary to make out a sexual harassment claim under Title 
VIT, her having to withstand and deal with that treatment certainly could have 
caused her work performance to suffer. Thus, under the good faith 
discrimination claim, a court could conclude that racial and gender scripting 
were the root causes for adverse employment action taken against Shannon. 
And, in defending itself against the claim by, for example, asserting the 
affirmative defense of the legitimate business purpose, Ford would have to 
take such scripting into account. 
2. Performing Against Identity: Manatt v. Bank of America232 
In Manatt v. Bank of America, a racial harassment and retaliatory 
discharge case, Li Li Manatt, a Chinese American, alleged violations of 
section 1981 based on harassing treatment she suffered during her two-and-a-
half years working in the trade finance department of a Portland, Oregon 
branch of the Bank of America ("Bank,,).233 Specifically, Manatt endured 
racial epithets ("China Man" and "China Woman"), taunts relating to her 
232. Manatt v. Bank of Am., 339 F.3d 792 (9th Cir. 2003). 
233. [d. at 794-95. 
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"slanted" eye shape and, in particular, her accented spoken English.234 Manatt 
complained both to the Bank's human resources department as well as to her 
supervisor, Bill Gilmore, who, instead of being concerned for Manatt, 
admonished her for complaining formally to the human resources department. 
Gilmore also stated that the racial and ethnic taunting was '~ust joking" and 
"wasn't serious."235 Following her complaints, Gilmore directed the trade 
finance employees to "be more sensitive about each other's feelings."236 
Although the taunting stopped after this, the Bank later transferred Manatt 
from the trade finance department to another division and, according to 
Manatt, started to reduce her job responsibilities, despite maintaining both her 
salary and title as a "trade finance specialist." Eventually, however, Manatt 
was given the title of "administrative assistant" to match her responsibilities 
on the job.237 
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the district court's granting 
of summary judgment to the Bank on both of Manatt' s claims. With respect 
to the racial harassmentlhostile environment claim, the court held that the 
allegedly harassing conduct "was neither severe nor pervasive enough to alter 
the conditions of Manatt's employment.,,238 And, while the court stated that 
it was "certainly troubled" by incidents in which Manatt's colleagues 
disparaged her accent and pulled their eyes back to a slant, the court 
. characterized this conduct together with the verbal taunting as "simple 
teasing" and "offhand comments," which under harassment law constitute 
non-actionable forrnsof discrimination. 239 
With respect to the retaliatory discharge claim, the court simply found no 
causal connection between Manatt' s complaints about the harassment and her 
demotion within the Bank. After all, the court stated, Manatt herself had 
"admitted that the trade finance group [had] suffered from a reduction in 
workload" due to the Asian financial crisis, and pointed out that at some time 
after she had complained, Manatt had been selected to participate in a loaned-
executive program.240 Moreover, the court held that even accepting Manatt's 
allegations that her supervisor allowed her to be treated meanly by her co-
234. Id. at 795-96. 
235. Id. at 796. 
236. Id. 
237. Id. 
238. Id. at 799. 
239. Id. at 798-99. 
240. Id. at 800-01. 
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workers following her complaints, "[m]ere ostracism in the workplace is not 
grounds for a retaliation claim."241 
The Manatt case, typical of many harassment cases, is especially 
frustrating because it demonstrates the absurdity of judges announcing what 
constitutes harassment when they likely have never been subject to the type 
of harassment experienced by a plaintiff.242 Even a lay person might 
(reasonably) assume that racial taunting such as that experienced by Manatt 
is not to be tolerated in the workplace, however, because the taunting was not 
hostile and pervasive under existing harassment case law, Manatt' s harms also 
went unremedied. Again, Manatt might have brought a successful good faith 
discrimination claim, where both her harassment and retaliation claims failed. 
First, social stereotypes of Asians and Asian women in the workplace, 
even according to the reported facts, seemed to abound. Manatt was scripted 
as foreign ("China Man/W oman") based on her appearance (her "slanted" 
eyes) and her accent, which her co-workers ridiculed at some length.243 Asian 
Americans are commonly perceived in this way, regardless of whether they 
are fifth- or first-generation citizens.244 Also, in his disapproval of Manatt's 
reporting of the harassment to the human rights department and telling her that 
the taunting was "simple teasing," "just joking," and "wasn't serious," 
Gilmore ( the supervisor) might have been imposing unreasonable expectations 
on her to endure such conduct precisely because she was acting against type, 
where that "type" requires Asians to be quiet and not rock the boat, and where 
it requires Asian American women to be especially passive and non-
assertive.245 By refusing to allow herself to be subjected to what even the 
court called "offensive and inappropriate,,246 treatment, Manatt was 
241. Id. at 803. 
242. The Honorable Richard C. Tallman, who wrote the majority opinion, is a 1978 graduate of the 
Northwestern University School of Law. The other two members of the panel deciding the case were the 
Honorable 1. Clifford Wallace and the Honorable Donald P. Lay, graduates of the law schools at the 
University of California at Berkeley-Boalt Hall ('55) and University of Iowa College of Law (,51), 
respectively. Although the judges' racial backgrounds are unknown, they are presumably male based on 
their names. They are also likely white, based on the years of their graduation from law school and years 
on the federal bench. 
243. Manatt, 339 F.3d at 795-96. 
244. See FRANK H. Wv, YELWw: RACE IN AMERICA BEYOND BLACK AND WHITE 39-77, 79-129 
(2002) (examining model minority and perpetual foreigner stereotypes of Asian Americans); Pat K. Chew, 
Asian Americans: The "Reticent" Minority and Their Paradoxes, 36 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1 (1994) 
(exploring paradoxical stereotypes of Asian Americans, both in popular and legal discourses, and their 
damaging consequences); Cho, supra note 170; Saito, supra note 170. 
245. See Chew, supra note 244, at 38; Cho, supra note 170. 
246. Manatt, 339 F.3d at 798. 
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performing against her script. Gilmore reminded her of this script and her 
non-compliance with it when he initially responded, essentially, that Manatt 
was overreacting and should have simply put up with the workplace 
"joking."247 
While Gilmore did order Manatt' s co-workers to be "more sensitive about 
each other's feelings," which finally resulted in the termination of the racial 
taunting, her subsequent demotion and transfer-both figurative and 
literal-constituted adverse employment action which followed her counter-
performance, which Manatt claimed as retaliation on the Bank's part.248 The 
Bank offered its legitimate business purpose for her demotion/transfer and 
ultimate termination, arguing that it had demoted and terminated Manatt not 
because of her race and gender, but because the Bank's general reduction in 
workload required such transfers and because Manatt had not shown herself 
to be as competent an employee as others at her branch.249 Under the good 
faith discrimination claim, however, the Bank would have been required to 
show how it measured competence and how the reduction in workload had 
impacted the branch more specifically. For example, the court noted that "the 
Asian financial crisis" was one reason for the Bank's reduction in workload.250 
Did the Asian financial crisis have a specific and significant impact on 
Manatt's work? Had she formerly been assigned to deal with Pacific Rim 
clients? Such inquiries could have been made under the good faith claim, and 
perhaps in the end, the Bank still would have prevailed if it had been able to 
respond to those questions sufficiently. But even in that case, better inquiries 
challenging discursive practices in the workplace could and would have been 
made. 
3. Over-Performing Identity: Citroner v. Progressive Casualty Insurance 
Co.251 
The plaintiff in Citronerv. Progressive Casualty Insurance Co., George 
Citroner, was a Latin0252 male who was hired by Progressive as a claims 
adjuster/representative. Shortly after beginning his employment, Citroner was 
247. [d. at 796. 
248. [d. 
249. [d. at 801. 
250. [d. 
251. Citroner v. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 208 F. Supp. 2d 328 (E.D.N.Y. 2002). 
252.- Demonstrating a rather sophisticated understanding of multiracial identity categories, Citroner 
also identifies himself, in varying parts, as Argentinean, Puerto Rican, white, black, and Asian. He also 
identifies himself as being "tan" in skin color. [d. at 332. 
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pulled aside by his supervisor John Noto, who, upon hearing Citroner 
speaking Spanish with a client, instructed him to "act more 'white'" and to 
"'lose that cocky Spanish attitude. ' ,,253 According to Citroner, Noto also gave 
more work to Citroner than to other similarly-situated employees in an attempt 
to drive him out of the job and often yelled at him, calling him "Speedy 
Gonzalez" in front of his many co-workers.254 At various times during his 
employment, Noto also directed Citroner to remove an Argentinean flag from 
and placed a Speedy Gonzalez doll at his workstation, mocked the way he 
spoke Spanish, berated him as stupid, incompetent, an idiot, and a monkey, 
and made negative comments about Latinos generally.255 Mter complaining 
about this conduct and receiving little or no response, Citroner indicated a 
willingness to resign from Progressive. Shortly thereafter, Progressive 
terminated him. Citroner subsequently sued Progressive, alleging claims of 
hostile work environment harassment and discriminatory 
termination/constructive discharge, pursuant to both Title vn and section 
1981.256 
The court granted summary judgment to Progressive on both the 
harassment and discriminatory termination claims. Here, as in Manatt, the 
court held that the conduct Citroner complained of did not rise to the level of 
extraordinary severity required by harassment law.257 Moreover, with respect 
to the discriminatory discharge claim, the court held that assuming Citroner 
had made out his prima facie case under the McDonnell-Douglas burden-
shifting framework, he had failed to rebut as mere pretext Progressive's 
articulated legitimate reason for his termination, which involved a disputed 
altercation between Citroner and another Progressive claims 
adjuster/representative.258 
The stereotypes at work in this case are obvious and require little 
discussion. More interesting is that this case involves the perceived "over-
performance" of identity. That is, Citroner, knowing that his supervisor held 
some contempt for Latinos generally, continued to speak Spanish to Spanish-
speaking customers and continued to display an Argentinean flag at his work 
station, despite Noto's disapproval of both. In other words, in refusing to 
"tone down" his racial and ethnic background and in refusing to "act more 
253. [d. at 333 (citing Citroner's complaint and various exhibits attached thereto). 
254. [d. 
255. [d. at 333, 335. 
256. /d. at 334-36. 
257. [d. at 340. 
258. See infra notes 259-63 and accompanying text. 
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white"--expectations which never should have been placed upon him in the 
first place-Citroner incurred risks, which ultimately materialized in his work 
performance and ultimate termination, by not assimilating in the way that 
Noto demanded. 
The causation element again requires further explanation and inquiry, and 
Progressive's legitimate business purpose warrants some detailed discussion 
in that regard. Progressive claimed that Citroner was terminated because of 
an altercation between him and one of his co-workers, Tina Albanese, which 
also led to complaints that Citroner was threatening to female workers.259 
Apparently, it was known throughout the workplace that Citroner and Noto 
did not get along. One night as Citroner was leaving work with co-worker 
Dominick DeCicco, he approached Albanese, who was in her car, and 
purportedly stated to her that he had "heard that you hope that I get frred.,,260 
Albanese responded that although she did not like Citroner, they could work 
together. According to Albanese, Citroner then "exploded" at her, screaming 
and cursing at her so menacingly that she feared he would strike her.261 
Citroner, on the other hand, testified that Albanese had approached him as 
they were leaving work and that he stated that he had heard that she hoped he 
would be fired. Citroner alleged that both he and Albanese had yelled at each 
other, but he denied cursing at her.262 Other witnesses' accounts of the 
altercation matched Albanese's account, while DeCicco's account offered yet 
another version of the altercation, which involved only Albanese's cursing and 
screaming at a calm and reserved Citroner.263 
Albanese's version of the altercation is especially troubling and if 
credibly supported, Progressive certainly could have prevailed in asserting 
legitimate business purpose as an alternative defense under the good faith 
discrimination claim. As in the Manatt case, however, it seems a deeper 
inquiry into causation and stereotyping, both about the racial harassment and 
the altercation between Citroner and Albanese, would have been helpful on 
many levels, and which could occur during the defendant's presentation of its 
affirmative defense. While the scripting issues as they relate to the alleged 
harassment are fairly obvious, do they likewise exist in different form with 
259. Citroner, 208 F. Supp. 2d at 333. 
260. Id. at 334. 
261. Id. at 334-35. Albanese specifically alleged that Citroner called her a ''fucking whore bitch" and 
a "cunt bitch." Id. 
262. Id. at 335. 
263. Id. at 338-39. 
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respect to the altercation? In Rashomon264 fashion, does the "true" story of 
what happened between Citroner and Albanese lie somewhere between their 
versions of the altercation? To what extent are their versions of the story 
informed by racial and gender scripting of Latino males as predatory265 and of 
assertive women as "bitches"?266 From both a feminist and critical race 
perspective, the Citroner case is deeply distressing, for it implicates not only 
raw racism but the much more complicated and intersectional issues of raced 
patriarchy and misogyny and gendered and sexualized racism. In the end, 
here, as in Manatt, Citroner might have failed on his good faith claim if 
Albanese's version of the altercation had proven to be more credible. 
However, given its potentially raced and gendered nature, the altercation itself 
deserves a much deeper level of inquiry than conventional civil rights law 
allows, but which the good faith causation element would require. 
264. RAsHOMON (R.K.O. Radio Pictures 1950). This classic film, directed by Akira Kurosawa, is 
a brilliant interrogation of subjectivity and the ultimate instability of the facts that constitute "truth." The 
film tells the "story," set in a forest in feudal Japan, of a bandit's rape of the wife of a samurai and the 
subsequent murder of the samurai by the bandit. The story of the crime unfolds before the "court" ---or the 
camera and, thus, the film viewer-in a series of flashbacks; that is, the crime is recounted in tum and in 
testimonial fashion by each of the three main players-the bandit, the dead samurai (through a medium), 
and the samurai's wife (i.e., the victim)-and then finally, by a woodcutter who, hiding among the trees, 
witnessed the rape and murder as an "uninvolved" but deeply impacted observer/witness. Each of the three 
"players" conveys a story that is similar in some details, but profoundly different in others, as each narrator 
remembers and retells the story in a manner that makes him or her least culpable and most innocent. These 
divergent narratives are not offered, however, for the purpose of making the viewer predict whose story is 
the true one, but rather to compel the viewer to contemplate the very notion of truth. Is the "true" story of 
the rape and murder really knowable in any objective sense? Or do the subjectivities of each of the 
narrators/players make the truth unknowable? Although the woodcutter's version is offered at the end of 
the film as perhaps the "real" version of the story, the film viewer is left to wonder whether even his version 
of the story is true, for we know little of what informs his interpretation of the heinous events. 
265. See DAVID G. GUTIERREZ, WALLS AND MIRRORS: MEXICAN AMERICANS, MEXICAN 
IMMIGRANTS, AND THE POLmCS OF ETHNICITY (1995); J. Jorge Klor de Alva, The Invention of Ethnic 
Origins and the Negotiation of Latino Identity, in CHALLENGING FRONTERAS: STRucruRING LATINA AND 
LATINO LIvES IN TIlE U.S.: AN ANTIIOLOGY OF READINGS 55 (Mary Romero et al. eds., 1997) (examining 
"[tlo what extent ... Chicano or Puerto Rican 'latino' identities are a result of the subordinate status of the 
community ... and to what extent ... [they are] evidence of the vitality of cultural negotiation in a complex 
multiethnic society"); see generally 0Tr0 SANTA ANA, BROWN TIDE RISING: METAPHORS OF LATINOS IN 
CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN PuBuc DISCOURSE 65-103 (2002) (exploring usage of stereotypes of Latinos 
as aggressively invasive and animalistic during the campaign to place Proposition 187 on the California 
ballot). 
266. See, e.g., GlJERRIILA GIRLS, BITCHES, BIMBOS, AND BALLBREAKERS: THE GUERRILLA GIRLS' 
lLLUSTRA TED GUIDE TO FEMALE STEREOTYPES 25-26 (2003) (exploring history of stereotypes of feminist 
women). 
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4. The Case of the White Plaintiff: Bainbridge v. Loffredo Gardens, Inc. 267 
Bainbridge v. Loffredo Gardens is unlike other cases discussed in this 
subpart in that it involves a white male plaintiff who brought his Title VII and 
section 1981 claims against Loffredo not for, as one might guess, reverse 
discrimination, but for harassment based on derogatory comments made about 
Asians in particular, and other minorities more generally. Loffredo Gardens, 
a fresh produce company, hired Thomas Bainbridge as its warehouse manager. 
Almost from the start of his employment, Bainbridge heard the Loffredos 
(Mike, Jim, and Larry), owners and upper managers of the company, 
collectively and frequently refer to Asians as "Jap," "nip," and "gook" and to 
other minorities as "spic," "wetback," "monkey," and "nigger."268 The 
Loffredos allegedly demonstrated an especial hostility toward "Jap" produce 
companies, as Mike Loffredo perceived that Japanese corporations were 
driving them out ofbusiness.269 The anti-Japanese sentiment at the workplace 
made Bainbridge particularly uncomfortable, as he was married to a Japanese 
American woman. According to Bainbridge, when he reminded the Loffredos 
about his wife's ethnicity, they stepped up the derogatory remarks in order to 
"aggravate" him. 270 
Bainbridge complained to an immediate supervisor about the harassment, 
who indicated he would take care of the problem. But when Bainbridge left 
for vacation shortly after registering his complaint, three supervisors, 
including the one to which he had spoken about the harassment, complained 
to the Loffredos that Bainbridge behaved abusively and threatened to leave if 
the Loffredos did not terminate Bainbridge.271 Thus, upon his return from 
vacation, Loffredo terminated Bainbridge. Bainbridge subsequently filed suit 
under Title VII, section 1981, and Iowa's state civil rights statute claiming that 
as a result of his association with a Japanese American, he had suffered from 
a hostile work environment because of the derogatory comments made about 
Asians and other minorities by the Loffredos and that he had been terminated 
in retaliation for his complaints about the harassing conduct. 272 
267. Bainbridge v. Loffredo Gardens. Inc .• No. 4:02-CV-40192. 2003 WL 21911063 (S.D. Iowa 
July 31. 2003). 
268. [d. at *1. 
269. [d. 
270. [d. 
271. [d. at *2. 
272. [d. 
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The court granted the Loffredos' motion for summary judgment, which 
had been filed on procedural and substantive grounds, and held on the merits 
that not only had Bainbridge failed to allege a prima facie case of 
discrimination, but even if he had, he had failed to demonstrate that 
Loffredo's termination of him for his purportedly abusive behavior was a 
pretext for intentional discrimination.273 Not unexpectedly, given the way the 
burden-shifting framework operates, Bainbridge's retaliation claim failed 
specifically because of this failure to show pretext. The court's hostile 
environment analysis is significantly more interesting, however. 
The court noted that while a white person is not protected directly under 
section 1981, he or she may assert a section 1981 harassment claim based on 
his or her association with a protected minority.274 However, in order for the 
harassment to be actionable under section 1981, it must be "specifically 
directed at the person's association with a non~white."27s And although one 
of Bainbridge's former co-workers testified in a sworn declaration that he had 
heard other Loffredo employees refer to Bainbridge's wife as his "chinky 
girlfriend" or "gook girlfriend," those comments were irrelevant because 
Bainbridge himself had not been aware ofthem.276 Moreover, the court stated 
that in order for Bainbridge to make his prima facie harassment claim, he had 
to show that the racially derogatory comments he had been aware of were 
truly unwelcome by him. The court reasoned that because Bainbridge had 
"not indicated that he objected to hearing derogatory remarks about Blacks or 
Hispanics, or that he in any way indicated that racial slurs about Blacks and 
Hispanics were unwelcome," his environment had not been sufficiently hostile 
or abusive.277 
In this case, Bainbridge, like Andrew in the hypothetical in Part I.B.4 of 
this Article, exemplifies a white male who typically would not be subjected 
to a particular image repertoire in the workplace, but for the fact of his chosen 
outsider-alignment. The difference between Bainbridge and the hypothetical 
Andrew is the nature of the alignment, which is personal for Bainbridge and 
political and professional (and perhaps personal, as well) for Andrew. 
With respect to the good faith elements of existing workplace stereotypes 
and performing against identity, the Loffredo opinion is especially troubling 
for several reasons. First, the court presumes that white employees do not 
273. [d. at *4. 
274. [d. at * 11. 
275. [d. 
276. [d. 
277. [d. at *12. 
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experience legally cognizable harassment because of an employer's regular 
use in the workplace of extremely derogatory racial epithets such as "spic," 
"wetback," "monkey," "nigger," Jap," "nip," "chink," and "gook," perhaps 
because all Whites are presumed to be "in on the joke," which in tum 
implicates the normalization of white supremacist values and beliefs. Second, 
even when some of those terms were used to refer directly to Bainbridge's 
association with an "outsider"-his Japanese American wife-the court 
designates those comments as immaterial because although Bainbridge's co-
workers had been aware of such comments, Bainbridge had not been. Here, 
the court wrongly assumes that comments made about Bainbridge's interracial 
relationship not only would not be offensive to his white co-workers, but 
would have no impact on their perceptions of Bainbridge as one not worthy 
of respect because of his marriage to a "gook." And finally, the court rubs salt 
in Bainbridge's wounds by not only dismissing his claims based on his not 
being aware of comments referring to his "chinky girlfriend," but also 
chastising him for not being sufficiently offended by the Loffredo's 
derogatory comments about non-Asian minorities! Notably, though, even if 
Bainbridge had voiced more concern over such comments, they would have 
been irrelevant to the court since in order for them to be actionable under 
section 1981, they must be "specifically directed at the person's association 
with a non-white.'>278 
The good faith discrimination claim would have enabled Bainbridge not 
only to obtain some remedy for harm he suffered as an outsider-aligned white 
male but also to begin to deconstruct the sociocultural paradigm of White 
versus Other, of the purportedly unraced and the raced. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article has employed "critical race realism" to theorize a good faith 
discrimination claim. In doing so, it has attempted two interventions, one 
doctrinal and one theoretical. Doctrinally, the good faith discrimination claim 
explicitly traverses the boundary between public and private law by using the 
contractual doctrine of the implied obligation of good faith to effect a public 
law norm of equality. Theoretically, the good faith discrimination claim 
attempts to take account of and actualize Iris Marion Young's "five faces of 
oppression" by operationalizing Devon Carbado and Mitu Gulati's theory of 
"working identity." Moreover, the good faith discrimination claim attempts 
278. [d. at * II. 
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to drive theory into praxis by shifting its analytical inquiry away from 
intentionality and the "perpetrator perspective"-so deeply embedded in 
conventional civil rights law-and directly toward the conditions and agents, 
both material and ideological, of group-based subordination. It is important 
to point out that this Article does not argue that racial and gender identity and 
difference, specifically as those identities are lived in the workplace, should 
be deconstructed to the point of non-existence. Rather, the good faith 
discrimination claim means to address, contextually and specifically, the 
material burdens and risks imposed on workplace-outsiders by their 
ideological "image repertoires." In this way, the claim hopes to produce not 
less, but more, discussion about race and gender in the workplace, discussion 
that captures the profound complexity of what it means to live and work in a 
diverse society. 
It is my hope, also, that this Article will help bring critical scholars, legal 
realists, and contracts scholars together, so that we might rekindle the 
controversy over what constitutes the public and private law in American 
jurisprudence, and so that we might continue to interrogate how our 
constructions and/or deconstructions of the public-private dichotomy 
implicate and affect our common goal: the elimination of the material and 
ideological conditions and causes of inequality. 
